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Articles
Why Some Religious Accommodations for
Mandatory Vaccinations Violate
the Establishment Clause
HILLEL Y. LEVIN*
All states require parents to inoculate their children against deadly diseases prior to
enrolling them in public schools, but the vast majority of states also allow parents to opt
out on religious grounds. This religious accommodation imposes potentially grave costs
on the children of non-vaccinating parents and on those who cannot be immunized. The
Establishment Clause prohibits religious accommodations that impose such costs on third
parties in some cases, but not in all. This presents a difficult line-drawing problem. The
Supreme Court has offered little guidance, and scholars are divided.
This Article addresses the problem of religious accommodations that impose third party
harms in the context of states' mandatory vaccination programs and proposes one
approach to the line-drawing problem. This approach is consistent with the cases, offers
predictable results in many situations, and accounts for relative judicial and legislative
competencies. It suggests that in most cases, laws that offer religious exceptions,
exemptions, or accommodations that impose third party harms are only unconstitutional
if the law offers no comparable nonreligious exceptions.
Under this approach, most states' religious accommodations in the vaccination context
violate the Establishment Clause. The Article also considers the relevant political
dynamics and important implications of this conclusion.
* Hillel Y. Levin is Professor of Law at University of Georgia School of Law. He is grateful to
James Oleske, Chris Lund, Nelson Tebbe, Micah Schwartzman, Tim Lytton, Nathan Chapman, Allan
Jacons, Kavita Shah Arora, Mark Navin, Stacie Kershner, Stephen Teret, Saad Omer, and Daniel
Salmon for their valuable feedback. He especially thanks his research assistant, Michelle Hamill, for
her excellent work on this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
Children sometimes get severely ill or die because their parents, or
the parents of other children, refuse to vaccinate against preventable
diseases on religious grounds.' Nonetheless, forty-seven states permit
parents with religious objections to expose their own or others' children
to these serious risks. Such religious accommodations are
constitutionally problematic under the Establishment Clause because
they impose harms on non-consenting third parties. However, the issue
is not clear-cut because some religious accommodations do not violate
the Establishment Clause, despite imposing harms on others.
I. See, e.g., Pauline W. Chen, M.D., Putting Us All at Risk for Measles, N.Y. TIMiIS (June 26,
2014), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/o6/26/putting-us-all-at-risk-for-measles/?_r=o (noting a
major resurgence in measles in 2014 due to parents who chose not to vaccinate their children);
Matthew F. Daley & Jason M. Glanz, Straight Talk about Vaccination, Sc. AM. (Sept. I, 2011),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/straight-talk-about-vaccination/ (stating that "the failure to
vaccinate children endangers both the health of children themselves as well as others who would not
be exposed to preventable illness if the community as a whole were better protected"); see also MARK
NAVIN, VAIUEIS AND VACCINI REIUSAL: HARI OUESTIONS IN Eiiics, EPISI IMOIOGY, AND HEAlIn CARL
5, 197 (2016) (discussing the recent outbreaks of measles and other diseases in pockets of the United
States, due in part to the increasing numbers of parents who refuse to vaccinate their children).
2. There is significant debate concerning whether parents who claim to have religious objections
should be believed. See infra Part I.C.4. However, for both philosophical and practical reasons this
Article assumes that such objections are genuine.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion... ").
4. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781 n.37 (2014) (discussing the
continued importance of limiting the burdens of a religious accommodation on nonbeneficiaries);
Christopher C. Lund, Religious Exemptions, Third Party Harms, and the Establishment Clause,
91 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1375 (2016); see also infra PART II (discussing the constitutionality of religious
accommodations that lead to third party harms).
5. See infra PART II.B. As leading law and religion scholar Kent Greenawalt has stated, "Jalmong
the most vexing questions...is when a legal measure that might otherwise be justified as an
accommodation to free exercise is instead a forbidden establishment of religion." Kent Greenawalt,
Establishment Clause Limits on Free Exercise Accommodations, i loW. VA. L. REV. 343, 343 (2007).
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The Supreme Court has never articulated a standard for
determining when religious accommodations that impose harm on third
parties are unconstitutional. Legal scholars have struggled with this
question, which has come to the fore in debates concerning the
Affordable Care Act's contraceptive mandate' and in the context of
same-sex marriage.!
This Article contributes to that discussion in two important ways.
First, it proposes a basic (though incomplete) approach to the broad
constitutional question of when religious accommodations that impose
third party harms violate the Establishment Clause. Second, it applies
this test to the accommodation of religious objectors in the context of
mandatory vaccination programs and concludes that the majority of
states' religious accommodation regimes violate the Establishment
Clause. Specifically, those states that limit accommodations to religious
objectors violate the Establishment Clause, whereas those states that
offer both religious accommodations and philosophical accommodations
do not.' This Article thus contributes to scholarly debates concerning
Establishment Clause doctrine and offers a practical foundation for
challenging religious accommodations in the vaccination context in order
to protect vulnerable children from contracting preventable diseases.
Part I reviews the scientific and legal landscape concerning
mandatory vaccination programs. Part II introduces the judicial and
scholarly debates concerning the Establishment Clause implications of
religious accommodations that impose third party harms. Part III
introduces, develops, and assesses a novel approach to the constitutional
question. Finally, Part IV applies this approach to the vaccination
context by analyzing the constitutionality of competing states' statutory
regimes and considering ancillary issues attendant to a judicial challenge.
6. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebeca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the
Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
343 (2014); Micab Schwartzman & Nelson Tebbe, Obamacare and Religion and Arguing off the Wall,
SLATE (Nov. 26, 2013, 2:32 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and_politics/`jurisprudencC/2013/
Ii/obamacare birth control mandate lawsuithow_a_radical-argumentwent_mainstream.html; see
also Brief for Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Hobby Lobby and Conestoga
et al., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354, 13-356); Brief for
Amici Curiae Church-State Scholars Frederick M. Gedicks et al., Supporting the Government,
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354, 13-356).
7. Barber v. Bryant, 193 F. Supp. 3d 677, 721-22 (S.D. Miss. 2016); Alan Brownstein, Gays, Jews,
and Other Strangers in a Strange Land: The Case for Reciprocal Accommodation of Religious Liberty
and the Right of Same-Sex Couples to Marry, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 389 (2010) (suggesting an alternative
"middle-ground" postion to the argument surrounding a state's recognition of same-sex marriage);
Jennifer C. Pizer, Navigating the Minefield: Hobby Lobby and Religious Accommodation in the Age of
Civil Rights, 9 HARv. L. & PoLi' REv. I (2015) (discussing the change in analysis of religious liberty
claims post the Hobby Lobby decision).
8. In using the term "philosophical accommodations," I mean any non-medical, non-religious
exception or exemption that a state offers; see also infra Part I.B (explaining that different state
statutes use different terms to describe such accommodations).
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1. THE MANDATORY VACCINATION LANDSCAPE: SCIENCE,
SOCIOLOGY, LAW, AND LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
Vaccination saves tens of thousands of lives and billions of dollars
each year.' Vaccines may stand as the single most significant and
successful public health intervention in history.0 It has prevented
countless serious diseases." Many life-threatening or debilitating diseases
like diphtheria, hepatitis B, measles, meningitis, mumps, polio, rubella,
tuberculosis, and yellow fever are now preventable and controlled due to
widespread immunization, while others have been, or may one day be,
entirely eradicated." State laws that mandate vaccination of children
prior to attending school have contributed to this achievement."
This Part briefly explains how and why vaccines work so well and
the dangers posed by non-vaccinators." In addition, it describes
9. NAVIN, supra note I, at 6.
10. Id. (quoting History of Vaccine Safety, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PRIVIINTION (Feb. 8,
201).
I I. See Immunization Facts and Figures: Nov. 2015 Update, UNICEF (2015),
http://www.unicef.org/immunization/files/Immunization-Facts-andFigures-Nov_2015 update.pdf;
Measles Vaccination Has Saved an Estimated 17.1 Million Lives Since 2000, WORLD HEALTH ORG.
(2015) http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2015/measles-vaccination/en/ (estimating that
vaccination for measles have saved approximately 17.1 million lives since 2000); Fangjun Zhou et al.,
Economic Evaluation of the Routine Childhood Immunization Program in the United States, 2009,
33 PEDIATRICS I, 5 (2014), http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/pediatrics/arly/2014/02/
25/peds.2013-o698.full.pdf (finding that routine childhood immunization among members of the 2009
US birth cohort will prevent approximately 42,oo early deaths and 20 million cases of disease).
12. Why Are Childhood Vaccines so Important?, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vac-gen/howvpd.htm (last updated May 19, 2014). This is a miracle of
modern medicine. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Achievements in Public Health,
1900-1999: Control of Infectious Diseases 621 (July 30, 1999),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm4829aI.htm; CiRs. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, Ten Great Public Health Achievements-United States, 19oo-1999 241 (Apr. 2, 1999),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ooo56796.htm; CTRS. FOR DisIASII CONFROL &
PREVENTION, Achievements in Public Health, 19oo-99 Impact of Vaccines Universally Recommended for
Children-United States, 1990-1998 243 (Apr. 2, 1999), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/
mmwrhtml/ooo568o3.htm. Smallpox has been successfully eradicated thanks to vaccine programs.
Polio may be eradicated within a generation.
13. See State Law & Vaccine Requirements, NAI'L VACCINE INFO. CTR.,
http://www.nvic.org/vaccine-laws/state-vaccine-requirements.aspx (last visited Aug. 5, 2017).
14. Opinions differ as to how to characterize those who elect not to vaccinate their children.
Some use the term anti-vaxxers (Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Compulsory Vaccination
Laws Are Constitutional, I o Nw. U. L. RI v. 589, 592 (2016)) or refer to people as anti-vaccine (NAVIN,
supra note I, at 2. Non-vaccinators sometimes refer to themselves as advocates of vaccine safety. Other
terms in use include vaccine denialist and vaccine refuser). In addition, those who elect not vaccinate
their children follow a range of practices. Some never vaccinate their children. Others vaccinate
against some diseases but not others. And still others may eventually allow their children to receive all
required vaccines, but refuse to do so according to the schedule mandated by state law. Id. I use the
term "non-vaccinator" (and its variants) as a catch-all term to describe all those who refuse to
vaccinate their children according to the schedule generally mandated by state law. To be clear, this
does not include those whose children are (I) exempt from vaccination mandates for medical reasons,
see infra Part.I.B., and (2) not vaccinated due to a lack of ready access to healthcare rather than to a
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mandatory vaccination laws, including the different state approaches to
exemptions and accommodations. Finally, it reviews the scholarly
literature concerning the constitutional implications of mandatory
vaccination laws.
A. THE SCIENCE AND DATA ON VACCINATION AND NON-VACCINATION
Vaccines work by introducing a benign pathogen, which teaches a
person's immune system how to fight off a related, non-benign version of
the disease.5 This process is safe. Complications from mandatory
vaccines are mild, and severe complications are almost non-existent. 6
The concept of conferring immunity through exposure is hardly a
new one. It was already known in antiquity that those who had recovered
from certain diseases would develop immunity to them." Thus, societies
began actively cultivating immunity by exposing people to mild forms of
potentially dangerous diseases." By the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, vaccines were developed from cowpox sores that
could immunize recipients against smallpox without exposing them to
even mild forms of the disease." Today, more than two dozen vaccines
against major diseases are available, and more are being developed.o
The efficacy of vaccines goes beyond their ability to immunize
individuals. Once enough people in a community are immunized, the
entire community benefits from what is known as "herd immunity.""
conscious choice to avoid vaccination.
15. Understanding How Vaccines Work, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (2013),
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/patient-ed/conversations/downloads/vacsafe-understand-color-
office.pdf.
F6. Id.; see also MMR (Measles, Mumps, & Rubella) VIS, CTRS. FOR Dis:AS: CONTROL AND
PRIvi NION (May 17, 2007), www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/vis/vis-statements/dtap/html; Rotavirus VIS,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Aug. 26, 2013), www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/vis/vis-
statements/rotavirus.html. Although some people continue to express concerns that vaccines may
cause autism spectrum disorders, these claims have been debunked by all available scientific evidence.
NAVIN, supra note I, at 6-7 (citing, among other sources, Gillian Baird et al., Measles Vaccination and
Antibody Response in Autism Spectrum Disorders, To ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 832-837;
Robert L. Davis et al., Measles-Mumps-Rubella and Other Measles-Containing Vaccines Do Not
Increase the Risk for Inflammatory Bowel Disease: A Case-Control Study from the Vaccine Safety
Datalink Project, 155 ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 354 (2001)); see also Frank
DeStefano, M.D. et al., Increasing Exposure to Antibody-Stimulating Proteins and Polysaccharides in
Vaccines Is Not Associated with Risk ofAutism, 163 J. PEDIATRICS 561 (2013) (finding that increasing
exposure to vaccines during the first two years of life was not related to the risk of developing an
autism spectrum disorder).
17. NAVIN, supra note I, at 3.
i8. Id.
19. Id. at 4.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 5 (explaining that "[il a sufficiently large percentage of the population develops
individual immunity, then that population will possess 'herd immunity"'); see also Allan J. Jacobs, Do
Belief Exemptions to Compulsory Vaccination Programs Violate the Fourteenth Amendment?,
42 U. MEM. L. REV. 73, 79 (2011) (explaining that "Iherd immunity occurs when the fraction of the
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Herd immunity occurs when so many people in a group are immunized
that the disease cannot reach any non-immunized individuals that
remain. Herd immunity is critical because there are always some in any
society who cannot, or will not, be immunized. Some people cannot be
vaccinated for medical reasons. Others choose not to be vaccinated,
either because of erroneous beliefs about the safety and efficacy of
vaccines, or for religious and other belief based reasons.24 Consequently,
society depends on herd immunity to avoid breakouts of serious diseases.
Herd immunity is only achieved once a large proportion within a
community is vaccinated. The vaccination rates necessary for conferring
herd immunity differ by disease, with some requiring as much as ninety-
five percent of the population to be vaccinated in order to be successful.25
This presents classic collective action and related free-rider problems.
For example, individuals can enjoy the benefits of herd immunity
without having their own children immunized. For this reason, some may
seek to avoid the cost, inconvenience, mild pain, and fear of vaccination
by choosing not to vaccinate themselves or their children, and instead
rely on herd immunity.26 But if enough people opt out, then herd
immunity in the community is threatened.
people who are immune to a disease is so great as to interrupt transmission of that disease by
removing most potential targets of infection from the chain of transmission."); Chemerinsky
& Goodwin, supra note 14, at 6oo (describing herd immunity as a critical portion of the population
becoming vaccinated and thus creating little opportunity for an outbreak).
22. NAVIN, supra note i, at 5.
23. For example, children cannot receive certain vaccines before reaching a certain age. Id.; see
also Recommended and Minimum Ages and Intervals Between Doses of Routinely Recommended
Vaccines CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (2016), https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/
pubs/pinkbook/downloads/appendices/a/age-interval-table.pdf. Some people can never be immunized
against some diseases. NAVIN, supra note i, at 5; see also Who Should NOT Get Vaccinated with these
Vaccines?, CTRs. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vpd-vac/should-not-
vacc.htm (last updated May 8, 2017). Others can be vaccinated, but will not be effectively immunized.
NAVIN, supra note I, at 5 (noting the importance of herd immunity for the members of the community
who cannot be immunized effectively either because they are too immunocompromised or because
their vaccines failed to develop individual immunity); Jacobs, supra note 21, at 82 (explaining that
some people who receive a vaccine cannot develop immunity to the disease; for example, "at least
io% of children fail to develop immunity to pertussis vaccine after the recommended three
injections."). Still others will not be vaccinated because of a lack of medical care. NAVIN, supra note I,
at 2.
24. NAVIN, supra note I, at II (noting that "Many parents [who refuse to vaccinej identify worries
about health considerations, but a smaller number of parents refuse vaccines for religious or
philosophical reasons.").
25. NAVIN, supra note I, at 5; Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 14, at 6oo (citing PAUL A.
OFii, DEADLY Cioics: How inu ANTI-VACCINI MOVEMNt ThREATENS Us ALL 145 (rev. foreword
2015 ed. 201I) (stating that highly contagious infections like measles and pertussis require an
immunization rate of about ninety-five percent)).
26. NAVIN, supra note I, at II (writing that some parents choose not to vaccinate their children
because "they know that the high rates of vaccination in their communities mean that their child is
unlikely to be exposed to the diseases she is not vaccinated against."); Jacobs, supra note 2 1, at 79-80
(asserting that herd immunity allows some number of free riders to benefit from the vaccination of
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States began to impose vaccination mandates in the nineteenth
century in order to reduce the likelihood and magnitude of disease
outbreaks." In addition, by prohibiting or limiting opt-outs, vaccination
requirements help eliminate the free-rider problem, which helps
generate and maintain herd immunity. Although vaccination mandates
have been exceptionally successful, causes for serious concern remain.
The vast majority of states have opted to exempt some objectors from
vaccination requirements," and as a consequence, non-vaccination
persists.2' As Allan Jacobs notes,
[i]n 2009, the proportion of teens who received a recommended
booster of diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus vaccine ranged from 93.7% in
Massachusetts to 52.7% in Arkansas and South Carolina. Worse, in
2008, the number of young children receiving even one dose of
measles-mumps-rubella vaccine ranged from 95.6% in Tennessee to
only 85.9% in Montana. 30
As a consequence, herd immunity has been threatened in pockets
around the country, and there have been outbreaks of serious diseases
that should have long since been eradicated through vaccination, such as
pertussis, measles, and polio." Hundreds of children have died because
others). Jennifer S. Rota et al., Processes for Obtaining Nonmedical Exemptions to State Immunization
Laws, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 645 (2001) (stating that some find it easier as a practical matter not to
vaccinate, knowing that their children are likely protected by herd immunity).
27. NAVIN, supra note I, at 7 (stating that in the nineteenth century, some states made vaccines
mandatory for children, especially for children who wished to attend school). All fifty states and the
District of Columbia have vaccination laws for public school children. Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra
note 14, at 599 (citing State School Immunization Requirements and Vaccine Exemption Laws, CTRS.
FOR DIsiEAsiE CoNTRoL AND PREIvi;NION (2015), http://www.cdc.gov/phlp/docs/school-vaccinations.pdf).
28. See infra PART.I.B.
29. Jacobs, supra note 2 1, at 8 1.
30. Id. (citing Estimated Vaccination Coverage, with Selected Vaccines Among Adolescents Aged
13-17 Years, by State and Selected Local Areas-National Immunization Survey: Teen, United States,
2009, CTRS. FOR Dis:ASI: CoNTRoL & PRINIoTON (2009), http://WWW2a.cdc.gov/nip/coverage/
nisteen/nisjiap.asp?fmt=v&rpt=tabolliap&qtrQI/2oo9-Q4/2o9; Estimated Vaccination Coverage
with Individual Vaccines and Selected Vaccination Series Among Children 19-35 Months of Age by
State and Local Area US, National Immunization Survey, Qi/2oo8-Q4/2oo8, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (2oo8), http://wwW2a.cdc.gov/nip/coverage/nis/
nis-iap2.asp?fmt=v&rpt=tabO2_antigen-iap&qtr=0 1/2008-04/2008).
31. The decline of herd immunity has led to recent disease outbreaks, killing hundreds and
hospitalizing thousands more. The United States has experienced outbreaks of pertussis, measles, and
polio in recent years. Jacobs, supra note 21, at 8o. According to one commentator, "[tihe rise of
exemptions to compulsory vaccination laws threatens to undermine the public health achievements
made possible by widespread immunizations." Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 14, at 6oi
(quoting Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are So Many Americans Opting Out of
Vaccinating Their Children?, 37 U. Micii. J.L. RLIlORM 353, 421 (2004); see also Alexandra Sifferlin,
4 Diseases Making a Comeback Thanks to Anti-Vaxxers, TIME (Mar. 17, 2014),
http://time.com/27308/4-diseases-making-a-comeback-thanks-to-anti-vaxxers/ (citing nineteen cases of
measles confirmed in New York City despite the fact that it was considered to be wiped out in 2000,
twenty-three cases of mumps at Ohio State University, and eighty cases of chicken pox in Indiana
which were thought to start from an unvaccinated child); Anthony Zurcher, Measles Outbreak at
Disney Raises Vaccination Questions, BBC NEWS: ECHO CHAMBERS (Jan. 22, 2015),
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of a small minority who refuse to vaccinate and the state laws that
accommodate them.
B. STATES' MANDATORY VACCINATION PROGRAMS, ACCOMMODATIONS, AND
EXEMPTIONS
All fifty states require children to be vaccinated against a range of
diseases in order to attend school." Most states have similar
requirements for private school and day care attendance.34 However,
state laws also include provisions that allow for non-vaccination in some
cases.
All fifty states allow children to remain unvaccinated if vaccination
is contraindicated for medical reasons.15 Typically, this exemption applies
to children who are immuno-compromised or too sick to withstand
vaccination." The justification for this exemption is self-evident and
uncontroversial: vaccines are mandated in order to protect a child's
health; if vaccinating the child would compromise her health, it does not
make any sense to do so.? Because they cannot be vaccinated, children
who are unvaccinated for medical reasons must therefore depend on
herd immunity.
More controversially, forty-seven states also allow for non-
vaccination for nonmedical reasons." Of these, the majority-twenty-
nine states-only accommodate those who object to vaccination for
religious reasons."' The remaining states provide religious
http://www.bbc.com/news/
blogs-cchochambers-30942928 (reporting that public health experts attribute the spread of the measles
outbreak at Disneyland in 2014 to the lower numbers of Americans who have been opting to receive
the immunization shots); Saad B. Omer et al., Letter to the Editor, Vaccination Policies and Rates of
Exemption from Immunization, 2005-2011, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1170 (2012) (compiling data from
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for school years 2005-2206 through 2010-201 I).
32. See Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 14, at 599-601 (arguing that compulsory vaccination
laws are essential to prevent death and avoid needless suffering).
33. Id. at 596; Jacobs, supra note 21, at 74. States' requirements vary in the details, but mandatory
vaccination laws typically require children to receive vaccinations against mumps, measles, rubella,
polio, tetanus, diphtheria, pertussis, Haemophilus Influenzae Type b (Hib), hepatitis A, hepatitis B,
rotavirus, varicella, and pneumococcal disease in order to attend public schools. Chemerinsky
& Goodwin, supra note 14, at 598; see also Vaccination Requirements, CIRS. FOR DisiAsiL CONTROL
& PREVENTION (July 21, 201I), http://www2a.cdc.gov/nip/schoolsurv/schImmRqmtReport.asp (listing
the mandatory vaccines for every state in the United States).
34. Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 14, at 598-99.
35. Id. at 597-98.
36. NAVIN, supra note i, at 5.
37. See id. at 197.
38. See infra PART I.A.
39. States with Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from School Immunization Requirements,
NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug. 23, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/
school-immunization-exemption-state-laws.aspx.
40. Id.
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accommodations as well as accommodations for those with moral,
philosophical, or other personal objections to vaccination.4" For the sake
of brevity and consistency, I refer to the latter as "philosophical
accommodations." Only three states-Mississippi, West Virginia, and
California-offer medical exemptions but no other accommodations.4
Finally, state laws may provide that in the event of a local outbreak
(or threat of outbreak) of a vaccine-preventable disease, children who
are unvaccinated (for medical or other reasons) may be temporarily
excluded from school.43
C. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
OF MANDATORY VACCINATION PROGRAMS AND RELIGIOUS
ACCOMMODATIONS
This is the first Article to comprehensively consider the
constitutionality of religious accommodations for mandatory vaccination
programs under the Establishment Clause. However, scholars and courts
have considered several other constitutional questions concerning such
programs, some of which have implications for the Establishment Clause
questions. This Part briefly reviews this literature.
i. Mandatory Vaccination Programs Are Constitutional
The most basic constitutional question is whether states have the
power to enact mandatory vaccination laws at all. That is, do people have
a basic right to refuse to be vaccinated or to have their children
vaccinated?
Courts have clearly and unanimously held that states do possess the
power to impose vaccination mandates on parents and children alike.44
This power stems from states' authority to maintain public health and
safety.45 The Supreme Court has twice upheld vaccination mandates for
adults and children, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts46 and Zucht v. King.47
4 1. Id.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., GA. Coin. ANN. tit. 20, § 20-2-771(f) (2013) (directing that "[d]uring an epidemic or
a threatened epidemic of any disease preventable by an immunization required by the Department of
Public Health, children who have not been immunized may be excluded from the school or facility
until (i) they are immunized ... or (2) the epidemic or threat no longer constitutes a significant public
health danger.").
44. See Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 14, at 604-08.
45. Id. at 6o4 (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. II, 28 (1905) (explaining that given the
prevalence of smallpox in the city of Cambridge, "it cannot be adjudged that the present regulation of
the board of health was not necessary in order to protect the public health and secure the public
safety.")).
46. Jacobsen, 197 U.S. i i.
47. Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922).
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Lower federal courts and state courts have followed suit." The power of
states to mandate vaccination is by now beyond serious dispute.
Although parents have a Fourteenth Amendment right to control
their children's' upbringing,49 that right is not absolute." It does not
trump the state's authority to impose vaccination mandates." Mandatory
vaccination laws meet strict scrutiny, and therefore defeat any due
process claim. There is a compelling government interest-protecting the
health and safety of those vaccinated, as well as that of those who cannot
be vaccinated for medical reasons-and vaccination is the least restrictive
means of achieving this compelling interest. 2
2. The Free Exercise Clause Does Not Give People the Right to
Decline to Vaccinate for Religious Reasons
Opponents of vaccination requirements sometimes argue that they
have a constitutional right to opt out of vaccination mandates on
religious grounds under the Free Exercise Clause.53 They are mistaken.
Current Supreme Court doctrine provides that facially neutral,
generally applicable laws are presumptively valid and do not run afoul of
the Free Exercise Clause. 54 Otherwise, the law must pass strict scrutiny.
Vaccination mandates are facially neutral because they apply to
everyone equally, and they have not been gerrymandered to target
people because of their religious beliefs.5 Even if that were not the case,
48. See, e.g., Phillips v. City of New York, 775 F.3d 538, 542 (2d Cir. 2015) (rejecting plaintiffs'
challenge to New York's mandatory vaccination law due to Jacobson's clear finding that states have
the police power to provide for compulsory vaccination based on the judgment of the state
legislature); Wright v. DeWitt Sch. Dist. No. I, 385 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Ark. 1965) (affirming the
principle from Jacobson that legislatures are the proper forum to determine whether compulsory
vaccinations are needed to protect the public health and safety).
49. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce
v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
50. "Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state as parens patriae may
restrict the parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor,
and in many other ways." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (upholding child labor laws
despite parental objection).
51. Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 14, at 606-o7 (citing Workman v. Mingo Cty. Bd. of
Educ., 419 F. App'x 348 (4th Cir. 2011); McCarthy v. Boozman, 212 F. Supp. 2d 945 (W.D. Ark. 2002);
Wright v. DeWitt Sch. Dist. No. 1, 385 S.W.2d 644 (Ark. 1965)).
52. Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 14, at 614.
53. Id. at 6o6 (citing Workman, 419 F. App'x 348 (upholding the constitutionality of a West
Virginia law requiring that all school children be vaccinated with no exemption for religious reasons)).
54. Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 14, at 609 (citing Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990)).
55. Cf Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 5o8 U.S. 520 (1993) (finding that a
city ordinance prohibiting the slaughter of animals violated the Free Exercise Clause where the facts
showed that the law was intentionally designed to target the activities of a particular religious
minority; further stating that "[a] law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general
application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny").
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a state law without religious accommodations would still meet strict
scrutiny.6
Finally, the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act," which was
designed to reverse Employment Division v. Smith and reinstate strict
scrutiny for laws that interfere with religious practices," has no bearing
on this issue because it only applies to federal laws, and not to state laws
like those that impose vaccination mandates." To be sure, several states
impose strict scrutiny as a result of having enacted their own Religious
Freedom Restoration Acts or due to state constitutional requirements."'
Even in these states, though, vaccination mandates that offer no religious
accommodations would pass muster because they meet strict scrutiny."
3. Religious Accommodations in Vaccination Laws Are
Unconstitutional When They Privilege "Recognized" Religious
Groups Over Those With Non-Mainstream Religious Beliefs
A different constitutional issue arises when states offer selective
religious accommodations to members of "recognized" religions, but not
to those who have idiosyncratic, non-"recognized," or non-mainstream
religious beliefs." Such religious accommodations violate the
Establishment Clause because they extend state recognition and
protection to believers with some religious beliefs and deny recognition
and protection to believers with others.'" In other words, they violate the
56. See Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 14, at 614.
57. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 20oobb (1993) (holding
unconstitutional as applied to the states by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
58. Id. at § 20oobb(b) (giving one of the purposes of the law as to restore the compelling interest
test in all cases where free exercise is substantially burdened).
59. Id. at § 20oobb; see also City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 507.
60. See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAS,
55 S.D. L. Ri v. 466, 473-79 (20 10).
61. Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 14, at 606-o7 (citing Wright v. DeWitt Sch. Dist. No. I,
385 S.W.2d 644 (Ark. 1965)).
62. See, e.g., Brown v. Stone, 378 SO. 2d 218, 220 (Miss. 1979) (striking down as unconstitutional a
statute that provided exemptions for "bona fide members of a recognized religious organization"); see
also McCarthy v. Boozman, 212 F. Supp. 2d 945, 948 (W.D. Ark. 2002) (striking down as
unconstitutional a statute that only provided exemptions for "members or adherents of a church or
religious denomination recognized by the State"); Boone v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938, 946 (E.D.
Ark. 2002) (finding unconstitutional the provision of a statute which limited religious exemptions to
practices of a "recognized church or religious denomination"); Sherr v. Northport-E. Northport Union
Free Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81, 91 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding unconstitutional the provision of a statute
which limited religious exemptions to "bona fide members of a recognized religious institution"); Daffi
v. Bd. of Educ., 267 N.E.2d 219 (Mass. 1971) (finding a statute unconstitutional because it limited
religious exemptions to adherents and members "of a recognized church or religious denomination").
63. See Dalli, 267 N.E.2d at 223; see also ANDREw KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS
NEtIRAIIY (2013) (explaining that selective religious accommodations that discriminate among
religions are unconstitutional).
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Establishment Clause because they allow the government to approve of
specific religious beliefs and to disapprove of others.6 4
Courts and scholars have struggled to define "religion" for
accommodation purposes without running afoul of the Establishment
Clause.6 5 As one district court judge noted, "[d]efining 'religion' for legal
purposes is an inherently tricky proposition. . . . [because it] brings the
government exceedingly close to the involvement with ecclesiastical
matters against which the First Amendment carefully guards."6 6 At a
minimum, the Supreme Court has held that "[t]he 'establishment of
religion' clause of the First Amendment means .. . [that the government
cannot] set up a church ... [,] pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another."7 Moreover, in granting
accommodations, laws violate the Establishment Clause if they privilege
adherents of mainstream religious groups over non-mainstream religious
believers.6 8 Likewise, the State cannot "aid those religions based on a
belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on
different beliefs." 69
Indeed, nearly every court faced with this question has held that
religious accommodations in the vaccination context that are limited to
certain "recognized" religions are unconstitutional.o
64. See, e.g., Alicia Novak, Note, The Religious and Philosophical Exemptions to State-Compelled
Vaccination: Constitutional and Other Challenges, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1101, III 1-15 (2005) (arguing
that most religious exemptions violate the Establishment Clause because they require the excessive
entanglement of the government in religious affairs).
65. Id.; see, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L.
Rvv. 579 (1982); Toward A Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARv. L. Ruv. 1056, 1o8o (1978);
see also Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 92 (noting that scholars and "courts have struggled to formulate
workable definitions [of 'religion']").
66. Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 92.
67. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. I, 15 (1947).
68. Welsh v. U.S., 398 U.S. 333, 356-57 ('970); see also Frazee v. Ill. Dept. of Emp't Sec.,
489 U.S. 829 (1989) (holding that denial of employment compensation on the basis that Christian's
refusal to work on Sundays was not based on the tenets of established religious sect was in
contravention of Free Exercise Clause); Ben-Levi v. Brown, 136 S. Ct. 930, 932 (206) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (stressing that courts cannot examine whether claimants properly understand their own
religions); Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015) (holding that religious protections exist whether or
not specific beliefs are compelled by or central to a system of religious belief); Thomas v. Rev. Bd., 450
U.S. 707 (1981) (holding that a religious accommodation could not be denied on the grounds that a
sincere religious believer held idiosyncratic religious beliefs that were not shared by co-religionists).
Some have even suggested that non-transcendental beliefs are entitled to accommodations granted on
the basis of religious belief. See U.S. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (offering a comparable analysis in a
similar case to Welsh); Kent Greenawalt, The Significance of Conscience, 47 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 901
(2010) (exploring the relationship between religious beliefs and beliefs of conscience).
69. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961).
70. Id.; see also McCarthy v. Ozark Sch. Dist., 359 F.3d 1029 (8th Cir. 2004); Davis v. State,
451 A.2d 107 (Md. 1982). But see Kleid v. Bd. of Ed., 406 F. Supp. 902, 904 (W.D. Ky. 1976) (holding
that an exception for "members of a nationally recognized and established church or religious
denomination" did not violate the Establishment Clause). Interestingly, these courts have split as to
the appropriate remedy. Compare Berg v. Glen Cove Sch. Dist., 853 F. Supp. 651, 655 (1994), and
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In the end, the only constitutional basis for assessing the eligibility
for a religious accommodation is to determine whether the person who
claims to hold the belief is sincere." Consequently, many states have
adopted broad, rather than selective, religious accommodations.72
4. Assessing the Sincerity of Non-Vaccinators' Religiousness
Religious accommodation schemes invite challenges of a different
sort when they seek to limit the "abuse" of religious accommodations by
those whose objections are not rooted in genuine or sincere religious
beliefs." Some commentators charge that most people who claim
religious exemptions do not possess sincere religious objections to
vaccination, but simply have wrong-headed pseudo-scientific beliefs that
lead them to question and reject the scientific and medical literature on
the safety and efficacy of vaccines.74 These people apply for religious
accommodations not because their beliefs are genuinely religious, but
rather because these accommodations offer their only opportunity to
lawfully avoid vaccinating their children. In other words, non-vaccinators
lie about the nature and source of their anti-vaccination views in order to
become eligible for states' religious accommodations. 5
Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81, 88-89 (1987) (both holding
that the religious accommodation must be broadened to include those who do not belong to
recognized religious groups), with e.g., Boone v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938, 952 (E.D. Ark. 2002)
(holding that the appropriate remedy is simply to "'sever' the religious exemption from the rest of the
statute"); Ozark Sch. Dist., 359 F-3d at 1037 (using the "ripeness doctrine" to determine when it would
be appropriate for courts to address the validity of an exemption statute); McCarthy v. Boozman,
212 F. Supp. 2d 945, 947 (W.D. Ark. 2002) (holding that an unconstitutional religious exemption
provision was severable from the remainder of the statute); Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218, 223 (Miss.
1979) (striking down the statutes entirely).
71. Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 81; U.S. v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944); see also JOHN T. NOONAN, JR.,
THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1998).
72. See, e.g., M. Craig Smith, A Bad Reaction: A Look at the Arkansas General Assembly's
Response to Mccarthy v. Boozman and Boone v. Boozman, 58 ARK. L. REV. 251 (2005) (showing that
the Arkansas legislature expanded its accommodation regime due to a judicial declaration of
unconstitutionality); Novak, supra note 64, at ii4-15 (2005) (suggesting that "the most simple"
religious accommodation regime that most readily passes constitutional muster is a simple "form
submission . . . [because it] requires no further evaluation beyond the applicant's own word.").
73. See Novak, supra note 64, at 1115, 1121, 1124-27, 1129 (using the term "abuse" to describe
those who take advantage of broad religious accommodation regimes); see also Dorit Rubinstein
Reiss, Thou Shalt Not Take the Name of the Lord Thy God in Vain: Use and Abuse of Exemptions
from School Immunization Requirements, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1551 (2014) (discussing the positions of
various religions on vaccination).
74. NAVIN, supra note I, ch. 2-3 (discussing the flawed systems of reasoning driving vaccine
refusers' decisions not to vaccinate); see also Dan M. Kahan, Climate-Science Communication and the
Measurement Problem, 36 ADVANCES IN POL. PSYCHOL. I, 2 (June 25, 2014) (examining the split in
cultural identity reasoning and collective-knowledge reasoning that leads to controversy over topics
like climate change notwithstanding a scientific consensus).
75. See Betsy Woodruff, Exemption Abuse, SLATE (Feb. II, 2015, 5:13 PM), http://www.slate.coml
articles/healthandscience/medical examiner/2015/02/unvaccinatedkindergartener-rates-states-nee
djtotightenreligious-and-philosophical.html; NAVIN, supra note I, at 105, 207 (citing Reiss, supra
[Vol. 68: r1931206
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Proponents of this charge point to the paucity of organized religious
theologies that reject vaccination, as well as to some non-vaccinators'
self-assessments concerning their true motivations.76 The practical upshot
of these arguments is that states should reject most applicants for
religious accommodations as insincere or eliminate religious
accommodations altogether.77 For example, Dorit Reiss argues against
offering religious accommodations at all, because "the majority of those
taking advantage of [such accommodations do so] for reasons other than
religion."178
There are several related problems-philosophical, constitutional,
and practical-with this approach. First, from a philosophical standpoint,
Navin and others maintain that the objections of many parents who
object to vaccination are properly characterized as religious objections.79
Navin suggests that some non-vaccinators are motivated by an "ethics of
purity" that encompasses both physical and spiritual purity and that
informs their life choices well beyond the vaccination context.o The
ethics of purity are similar in kind to (and may even draw on) religious,
spiritual, and transcendental beliefs; and the actions motivated by these
beliefs likewise parallel the kinds of choices made by religious believers
regarding diet, child-rearing, lifestyle, and personal identity." Regardless
of whether such objections are religious in the familiar sense, they share
critical core characteristics of classical religious beliefs and should fall
within the same category.
Second, constitutional doctrine may imply that such beliefs are to be
treated as religious. As noted previously, the state cannot limit religious
accommodations to "recognized" religions without running afoul of the
note 73 (discussing in great detail the evidence that substantial numbers of persons who claim religious
exemptions to vaccines are lying and are not doing so for religious reasons)); Linda E. LcFever, Note,
Religious Exemptions from School Immunization: A Sincere Belief or a Legal Loophole?, 1 10 PENN.
ST. L. REV. 1047, 1048 n. 7 (2oo6) (citing Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Worship Optional: Joining a Church to
Evade Vaccine, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/OI/I4/science/worship-
optional-joining-a-church-to-avoid-vaccines.html) (stating that some parents claim religious
exemptions "regardless of whether their objection to vaccination is legitimately grounded in a
religious belief.").
76. See LcFever, supra note 75, at 1048; Miriam Krule, Why Is There a Religious Exemption for
Vaccinations?, SLATI (Feb. 5, 2015, 3:23 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/health-and-science/
medicalexamincr/2015/o2/rcligiouscxemption forvaccineschristianscientistscatholicsanddutch
.html; NAVIN, supra note I, at 105, 207 (citing Reiss, supra note 73).
77. Reiss, supra note 73, at 1557.
78. Id.
79. MARK NAVIN, Prioritizing Religion in Vaccine Exemption Policies, Paper Prepared for
Bowling Green Workshop in Applied Ethics and Pub. Pol'y: "The Scope of Religious Exemptions"
(Apr. 17-18, 2015) (manuscript at 4-7), https://www.bgsu.edu/content/dam/BGSU/
college-of-arts-and sciences/philosophy/documents/conferences/2015 %2oReligious %2oExemptions/
Navin.pdf. [hereinafter NAVIN, Prioritizing Religion]; NAVIN, supra note i, ch. 3 & 6.
80. NAVIN, Prioritizing Religion, supra note 79, at 6.
81. NAVIN, supra note i, ch. 3 & 6; Navin, Prioritizing Religion, supra note 79, at 6.
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Establishment Clause. Consequently, courts have adopted a broad and
vague definition of what constitutes religion." The necessarily broad legal
definition of religion is arguably capacious enough to include many non-
vaccinators who claim the religious accommodation, even if a more
conventional, narrower conception is not.
Third, as a result of the broad and vague definition of religion in
American Constitutional law, it is difficult as a practical matter to reject
an accommodation for reasons of insincerity.4 Even if non-vaccinators
who claim the religious accommodation could be excluded from religious
accommodation schemes in theory, doing so is unrealistic as a practical
matter. States cannot easily distinguish sincere claims of religious
objection from insincere invocations of religion." After all, if religious
beliefs can be personal and idiosyncratic, who can say that any particular
person seeking a religious accommodation is lying or insincere, and on
what basis?
Perhaps due to the difficulty and costs associated with seriously
testing sincerity, states that offer religious accommodation typically do
not attempt to do so; and although it is not unheard of," there does not
appear to be many rejections of requested accommodations on sincerity
grounds. At the very least, a case-by-case approach to assessing sincerity
would be cost prohibitive;7 and rejecting an applicant on the grounds of
insincerity would, in turn, invite a costly lawsuit with an uncertain
outcome. As one public health expert put it, "[a] lot of states call their
exemptions religious, but anyone who wants it, gets it."s"
Thus, for philosophical, constitutional, and practical reasons, states
accept religious accommodations claims as sincere. To be clear, this does
not argue in favor of providing a religious accommodation at all. Rather,
82. See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
83. NAVIN, Prioritizing Religion, supra note 79, at 4-5 (showing the breadth and vagueness of
courts' definitions of religion for the purpose of religious objections, such as the U.S. Supreme Court's
use of the idea "that a religious objection emerges from convictions that are part of a person's
'ultimate concerns"' and Oregon's broader understanding of religion as 'any system of beliefs,
practices, or ethical values') (citing U.S. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. F63 (1965) and Douglas S. Diekema,
Personal Belief Exemptions From School Vaccination Requirements, 35 ANNUAL REV. OF PUB. HEALTH
275, 285 (2014)).
84. NAVIN, Prioritizing Religion, supra note 79, at 5.
85. Id. (postulating that "[w]hether someone's objection is sincere is an attribute of their inner
life that is generally opaque to the law.").
86. See, e.g., John Marzulli, Staten Island Father Sues Over Pre-K Vaccine Requirements, N.Y.
DAILY Ni ws (Jan. 3, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/education/s-father-sues-
pre-k-vaccine-requirements-article-1.1564952 (profiling father whose request for a religious exemption
was rejected where the city concluded that the father, a Catholic, did not "hold genuine and sincere
religious beliefs which are contrary to immunization").
87. NAVIN, Prioritizing Religion, supra note 79, at 5.
88. McNeil Jr., supra note 75 (quoting Daniel A. Salmon, an expert on vaccinations from Johns
Hopkins University School of Public Health).
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it is contingent: if a state chooses to offer religious accommodations, it
must offer them broadly and inclusively.
5. Do Religious Accommodations Violate the Fourteenth
Amendment?
Finally, at least one state court has held that religious
accommodations (and belief accommodations more broadly) violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." One scholar
has argued that such accommodations violate the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause as well."'
The Mississippi Supreme Court struck down a religious
accommodation to mandatory vaccination on Equal Protection grounds
because it "require[d] the great body of school children to be vaccinated
and at the same time expose[d] them to the hazard of associating in
school with children exempted under the religious [accommodation] who
had not been immunized as required by the statute."" As Allan Jacobs
explains, under this theory, vaccination schemes that accommodate
religious objectors run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause because they
give non-vaccinators a free ride on the herd immunity generated by those
who are not eligible for the accommodation and impose serious risks on
people who cannot be vaccinated for medical reasons.2 It appears that no
other court has adopted this argument.
Jacobs proposes an alternative Fourteenth Amendment challenge to
belief accommodations, this one rooted in Due Process rather than
Equal Protection. Under his theory, because school attendance is itself
compulsory, by creating an unnecessary risk of contracting a serious
disease, religious and other belief accommodations "violate[] the right of
children to enjoy the safest possible school environment."" That is, Due
Process prohibits a state from "compel[ling] children to be exposed to
unnecessary danger by requiring them to congregate in schools and
expos[ing] them to an increased risk of infection."9 4 This approach has
yet to be tested or vindicated in the courts.
II. RELIGIOUS AccoMMODATIONS AND THIRD PARTY HARMS
Federal and state laws privilege religious individuals and groups in a
variety of ways.'" These privileges are embedded in federal and state
89. Brown v. Stone, 378 SO. 2d 218, 223 (Miss. 1979).
90. Jacobs, supra note 2 1, at 74.
91. Brown, 378 SO. 2d at 223.
92. Jacobs, supra note 2 1, at 79-80.
93. Id. at 1o2.
94. Id.
95. See Hillel Y. Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities' Political Power, 48 U.C.D. L. Ri v. 1617
(2015) (discussing the significant political power of religious minorities to shape and influence laws).
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constitutions, statutes, and regulations.) Among the advantages enjoyed
by religious practitioners are accommodations, exceptions, and
exemptions from generally applicable laws that grant them dispensation
from obligations and prohibitions that apply to others.97 As a general
matter, such dispensations are benign and constitutionally permissible,
even if not constitutionally mandated. However, religious
accommodations that impose harm on non-consenting third parties
present serious constitutional questions under the Establishment Clause.
Religious accommodations that allow some parents to decline to
vaccinate their children present this problem, for three reasons. First,
they allow parents to expose their own children to the risk of contracting
life-threatening illnesses. Second, they threaten herd immunity and thus
subject those who cannot be vaccinated'" to the risks of disease
exposure."9 Third, in an attempt to mitigate these risks, some laws that
provide religious accommodations also exclude unvaccinated children
from schools during or in anticipation of disease outbreaks."o This denies
these children their right to education, a right enshrined in every state's
constitution."o'
Unfortunately, courts and scholars have not provided a systematic
approach or test for determining whether a particular religious
accommodation that imposes third party harms violates the
Establishment Clause. This Part reviews the doctrine and scholarship
concerning religious accommodations, the problem of third party harms,
and the limits of extant approaches.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Those who cannot be vaccinated include children who are immuno-compromised, those who
have not reached the necessary age for vaccination, and those who have been vaccinated but for who
immunity has not developed. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
99. See supra Part LA (explaining that for a vaccine to effectively immunize a community or a
school body from a particular disease, a critical percentage of the community must be immunized-a
concept known as "herd immunity"-or those who were not vaccinated remain at risk for that
disease).
oo. See GA. Coin. ANN. tit. 20, § 20-2- 7 7 1(f) (2013).io. Robyn K. Bitner, Note, Exiled from Education, 10 VA. L. Riv. 763, 779 (2015) (noting that
every state constitution guarantees some form of free public education, and many of offer students a
fundamental right to education). The Supreme Court's treatment of education suggests there may also
be some federal right to educational opportunities. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)
(holding that since education is "the very foundation of good citizenship ... the opportunity of an
education ... where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to
all on equal terms"); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (noting the importance of education in
allowing individuals to participate freely in society and the grave harms inflicted on children excluded
from public education).
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A. CONSTITUTIONALLY MANDATED AND CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMITTED
RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS: A PRIMER
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v.
Smith, routine religious accommodations were held to be constitutionally
mandated by the Free Exercise Clause1o 2 whenever a law interfered with
a religious practice, unless the law met strict scrutiny."o Of course, if an
accommodation is mandated by the Free Exercise Clause it cannot also
violate the Establishment Clause. In Employment Division v. Smith,
however, the Supreme Court held that most neutral and generally
applicable laws that incidentally interfere with religious practices do not
violate the Free Exercise Clause and are presumptively valid."o4 Today,
then, religious accommodations are typically not required by the
Constitution, and are instead a matter of legislative and administrative
judgment and choice.
Even after Smith, the Free Exercise Clause continues to mandate
some protections for religious groups. First, laws that explicitly or
implicitly discriminate against religious practitioners are unconstitutional
because they are not neutral and generally applicable.'5 For example, in
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, the Supreme Court
struck down an arguably facially neutral ordinance against animal
sacrifice because it was directed at, and only applied to, adherents of
Santeria.o' Citizens were free to kill animals for reasons other than
ceremonial sacrifice, and the record was rife with evidence of animus
towards practitioners of Santerfa.' 7 Likewise, in Tenafly Eruv
Association., Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, the Third Circuit held that
because a town only enforced a facially neutral ordinance against a
religious group, it violated the Free Exercise Clause.o' Since the town
102. U.S. CONsT. amend. I, cl. 2 (stating "Congress shall make no law... prohibiting the free
exercise [of religion]").
103. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (requiring the state to provide a "compelling
interest" to justify withholding unemployment benefits from Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-day
Adventist Church, for refusing to accept otherwise suitable work that did not allow him to abstain
from working on Saturday to observe the Sabbath); Levin, supra note 95, at 1620 n.9 (discussing the
Court's application of strict scrutiny to laws that interfered with religious practice for several decades);
Laura A. Colombell, Note, Retracting First Amendment Jurisprudence Under the Free Exercise Clause:
Culmination in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah and Resolution in the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 1127, 1133-35 (1993) (discussing the use of the
strict scrutiny standard in free exercise cases beginning with Sherbert).
104. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885-90 (1990); see also Levin, supra note 95, at 1620 n.9
(discussing the holding of Smith and its progeny); Kenneth Marin, Employment Division v. Smith: The
Supreme Court Alters the State of Free Exercise Doctrine, 4o AM. U. L. RI v. 1431(1991) (discussing the
immediate impact of Smith's holding on neutral laws of general applicability).
105. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
106. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534-42 (1993).
107. Id.
io8. Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2002); see a/so Levin,
supra note 95, at 1631-35 (discussing Borough of Tenafly in detail).
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accommodated nonreligious groups by declining to enforce the
ordinance against them, it had to accommodate the religious group as
well."o
Scholars and courts contest the reach and application of the Lukumi
principle." At the very least, it provides that state actors may not decline
to accommodate religious groups due to discriminatory animus."' At
most, religious practitioners are entitled to any accommodations that are
offered to nonreligious individuals and groups.
Religious institutions are also constitutionally entitled to another
kind of accommodation: they benefit from a "ministerial exception,"
which excuses them from anti-discrimination laws in matters concerning
the employment of ministers."' In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the
Court held that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits the government from
interfering with religious institutions' ability to hire their preferred
ministers." Although the Court left open the questions of who qualifies
as a "minister" and how far the exception applies, the upshot is that
religious institutions enjoy at least some kind of constitutionally-
mandated exception from generally applicable non-discrimination laws."
109. Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc., 309 F.3d 144, at 167-68.
I lo. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious
Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, I18 HARV. L. REV. 155, 200-13 (2004) (arguing
that Lukumi should be applied broadly as an exception to Smith); James M. Oleske, Jr., Lukumi at
Twenty: A Legacy of Uncertainty for Religious Liberty and Animal Welfare Laws, i9 ANIMAL L. 295,
301 (2013) (arguing for a much narrower construction of Lukumi and its progeny); Mark L. Rienzi,
Smith, Stormans, and the Future of Free Exercise: Applying the Free Exercise Clause to Targeted Laws
of General Applicability, io ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST Soc'Y PRAC. GROUPS 143 (2009); Carol M. Kaplan,
Note, The Devil Is in the Details: Neutral, Generally Applicable Laws and Exceptions From Smith,
75 N.Y.U. L. Rvv. 1045 (2000); Brief for Constitutional Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellees, Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d iLog (9th Cir. 2009) (Nos. 12-35221, 12-35223),
2012 WL 5915342.
III. MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2007); Rienzi,
supra note I io, at 143 (arguing that "except for rare cases of clear religious discrimination or animus,
virtually all laws challenged on federal free exercise grounds are found to be 'neutral and generally
applicable"'); Oleske, Jr., supra note Ito, at 340 (stating that "jun cases involving classifications that
raise no special danger of animus, the Court applies deferential rational basis review.").
112. See Laycock, supra note io, at 243-45 (advocating for tight limits on government discretion
and exemptions wherever possible for religious practices); see also Oleske, Jr., supra note I o.
113. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n,
132 S. Ct. 694, 696 (2012).
1 14. Id. at 706.
115. Id. (declining to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee is a minister and
instead basing its decision that the employee at issue was a minister because the church gave the
employee a distinct role from other church members, gave the employee the title of "Minister of
Religion, Commissioned," and provided for period review of her "skills of ministry" and "ministerial
responsibilities"); see also Herx v. Diocese of Ft. Wayne-South Bend Inc., 48 F. Supp. 3d ii68, 1177
(N.D. Ind. 2014) (finding that a language arts teacher at a Catholic junior high school was not a
minister where she was considered by the principal to be a "lay teacher" and never had any religious
training to be a teacher at the school); Conlon v. Intervarsity Christian Fellowship, 777 F.3d 829,
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Still, because of Smith, the vast majority of laws may constitutionally
apply to religious groups, even if they interfere with and limit religious
practices."' However, both before and since Smith," federal and state
legislatures and agencies have exempted religious practitioners from
many generally applicable laws that would otherwise restrict them."
Religious accommodations in the mandatory vaccination context are but
one example. Thousands of other accommodations have been included in
statutes and regulations governing taxation, medical services, child care,
drug policy, land use, copyright, food preparation, discrimination,
military service, immigration, environmental protection, employment,
education, dress codes, social security, and more."' The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA")1o and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA")"2 generalize the principle of
religious accommodation throughout federal law and in a variety of state
law contexts.2
Many of these religious accommodations do not impose harms on
others. For instance, few would argue that allowing a religious Jewish
member of the military to wear a small yarmulke while stationed on a
military base harms anyone . Similarly, there are no apparent costs
borne by third parties if religious believers alone are permitted to
partake of hoasca tea.1 4 However, some legislative and administrative
834-35 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding that a spiritual director for evangelical campus mission was a minister
despite having no title as a minister where the spiritual director's title reflected her religious training
and where she served a religious function for her church).
i16. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
117. Levin, supra note 95, at 1647-51 (discussing the phenomenon of legislative accommodations
of religion, of which there are thousands that pre-existed Smith, including for the preparation of food
in accordance with religious practices and exemptions in tax laws for religious groups and
organizations) (citing James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An
Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. Riw. 1407, 1445-46 (1992)).
118. To be sure, a strong case can be made that legislatures were always more accommodating of
religious practices than the Constitution required-even under the putative strict scrutiny regime in
place prior to Smith. Levin, supra note 95, at 1647-51. Nevertheless, as a doctrinal matter, it is fair to
say that the Court in Smith reduced the constitutional protections afforded to religious practices under
the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 1671.
i19. See Levin, supra note 95; Ryan, supra note i17.
120. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 20oobb (1993) (held
unconstitutional as applied to the states by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
121. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000CC (2000).
122. See Levin, supra note 95, at 1645 (discussing the sweeping impact of RFRA and RLUIPA);
see also Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 6; Greenawalt, Establishment Clause Limits, supra note 5.
123. 10 U.S.C. § 774 (2012) (expressly overturning a Supreme Court decision that permitted the
military to prohibit a Jewish member of the military from wearing a small yarmulke while stationed on
a military base).
124. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Benclicente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2oo6);
Greenawalt, Establishment Clause Limits, supra note 5, at 344; Frederick M. Gedicks & Andrew
Koppelman, Invisible Women: Why an Exemption for Hobby Lobby Would Violate the Establishment
Clause, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 51, 56 (2014).
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religious accommodations do harm third parties, and these raise complex
constitutional questions.
B. SOME RELIGIOUS AccoMMODATIONS THAT IMPOSE THIRD PARTY HARMS
ARE PROHIBITED BY THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: A LINE-DRAWING
PROBLEM
Legal scholars, led by Gedicks and Van Tassell,' as well as
Schwartzman, Schragger, and Nelson,"' have recently begun considering
in earnest the constitutionality of religious accommodations that impose
harms on third parties under the Establishment Clause. They have traced
a line of Supreme Court cases that stand for the proposition that the
Establishment Clause indeed prohibits at least some kinds of religious
accommodations that impose third party harms.
To understand why accommodations that impose third party harms
potentially violate the Establishment Clause, consider a simple
hypothetical. A state legislature adopts a law prohibiting murder.
However, in order to accommodate the unique needs of a local religious
group, the law permits the group to kill one unsuspecting and non-
consenting person each year in order to appease the group's deity. By
doing so, the state hands power over a non-assenting citizen's life to a
religious group, to do with as their religious beliefs dictate.' According
to the great legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart, in being granted this right,
the religious group is given sovereign authority by the state`s-precisely
what the Establishment Clause is meant to prevent. Thus, as Gediks and
Van Tassell explain, "accommodations that require [third parties] to bear
the costs of someone else's religious practices constitute a classic
Establishment Clause violation. Like the prototypical established church,
[such] accommodations grant a privilege to those who engage in the
accommodated practice at the expense of [those] who do not.'"'
125. The leading article here is Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 6.
126. See, e.g., NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUs FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AiE, CHAPTER 3 (2017)
(addressing the issue at length); Tebbe, Schwartzman, & Schragger, "How May Religious
Accommodations Burden Others?," in Law, Religion, and Health in the United States (Cambridge
University Press, 2017 forthcoming); Schwartzman & Tebbe, supra note 6; see also Brief for
Constitutional Law Scholars, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, supra note 6; Brief for Amici Curiae
Church-State Scholars, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, supra note 6.
127. Gedicks & Koppelman, supra note 124, at 60 (stating that if third party harms did not violate
the Establishment Clause, "then it would be permissible for the state to exempt Aztecs from homicide
laws.").
128. H.L.A. Hart famously opined that having a right is "being given by the law exclusive control,
more or less extensive, over another person's duty so that in the area of conduct governed by that duty
the individual who has the right is a small-scale sovereign to whom the duty is owed." H.L.A. HART,
Legal Rights, in ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 162, 163 (1982).
129. Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 6, at 363; see also TiLBun, supra note 126, at 52-54 (further
explaining the constitutional problem with such accommodations).
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In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., the Supreme Court considered
the constitutionality of a law that required employers to allow observing
employees observers to take a day off in order to observe their
Sabbath."' Applying the Establishment Clause, the Court struck down
this religious accommodation because it imposed harms on nonreligious
third parties: the "employers [who] had to carry the costs of workers
taking their Sabbath off, [and] other workers who had to work on days
they would have preferred to be home."... As the Court stated, the
Establishment Clause "gives no one the right to insist that in pursuit of
their own interests others must conform their conduct to his own
religious necessities."3 2 The Supreme Court thus articulated a "no third
party harms" principle: religious accommodations that impose costs and
harms on third parties violate the Establishment Clause.
In Cutter v. Wilkinson, the Court reaffirmed the "no third party
harms" principle.T3 4 In upholding the constitutionality of the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), the Court
stipulated that if a specific religious accommodation imposed a third
party harm, then it would be prohibited.' 5 In other words, the Court held
13o. Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
131. Greenawalt, Establishment Clause Limits, supra note 5, at 354; see also Gedicks & Van Tasell,
supra note 6, at 357-58 ("By giving employees an unqualified right not to work on their chosen
Sabbath, the statute 'externalized' the cost of accommodating Sabbath observance from the
Sabbath-observing employees onto employers and other employees who did not observe a Sabbath.").
132. Thornton, 472 U.S. at 710 (quoting Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. CO., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d
Cir. 1953)).
133. Greenawalt, Establishment Clause Limits, supra note 5, at 353 (noting that whether "others
have to bear the cost of the privilege" a religious accommodation grants "can make a crucial
difference for whether the accommodation is constitutional"); Gedicks & Koppelman, supra note 124,
at 54 ("The Establishment Clause generally prohibits the government from shifting the costs of
accommodating a religion from those who practice it to those who do not."); Gedicks & Van Tassell,
supra note 6, at 349 (stating that the Supreme Court "condemns permissive accommodations on
Establishment Clause grounds when the accommodations impose significant burdens on third parties
who do not believe or participate in the accommodated practice"); Kara Lowentheil, Where Free
Exercise Is A Burden: Protecting "Third Parties" in Religious Accommodation Law, 62 DRAKE L. REv.
433 (2014) (proposing a principled way of evaluating the burdens of religious accommodations on
third parties using existing doctrines); see also Oversight of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On the
Constitution and Civil Justice, of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015) (testimony of
Nelson Tebbe, Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School), https://judiciary.house.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2016/02/I 14-9-93282.pdf; Reply Brief for the Petitioners, Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356), 2014 WL 9755oo at *2 (stating that "when a party
seeks a religious exemption from a neutral law, the potential impact on third parties is at the very core
of the analysis") (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982)).
134. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2004) (stating that "[pjroperly applying RLUIPA,
courts must take adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on
nonbeneliciaries..."); see also Brief for Amici Curiae Church-State Scholars, Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby, supra note 6, at *5 (citing Cutter as authority that the Establishment Clause prohibits shifting
costs for the accommodation of religious beliefs to third party);
135. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720; RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 200OCC (2000).
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that RLUIPA is only constitutional where a requested accommodation
does not impose third party harms; otherwise, it would violate the
Establishment Clause.36
The Court again reaffirmed this principle in its recent decision in the
high-profile Hobby Lobby case."' There, the Court interpreted RFRA to
exempt the Hobby Lobby corporation from the so-called contraceptive
mandate, which imposed an obligation on employers to provide free
coverage for women's contraception for its employees as part of their
health insurance plans.' Although the Court held in favor of the
religious accommodation at issue, the majority noted that "[i]t is
certainly true that in applying RFRA 'courts must take adequate account
of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on
nonbeneficiaries.'"... Justice Kennedy amplified this point in his
concurrence, stating that religious accommodations may not "unduly
restrict other persons, such as employees, in protecting their own
interests, interests the law deems compelling."T4 o Although these
references to the "no third party harms" principle do not explicitly cite
the Religion Clauses, there are no other constitutional sources that
would support these statements.T4T Thus, as Tebbe has explained, the
Hobby Lobby decision "reaffirmed the rule against third party harms in
its decision-a majority of justices, and maybe every justice, signed on to
that core idea."T 4 2
If this "no third party harms" principle was ironclad, then the issue
of religious accommodations in the mandatory vaccination context would
be open-and-shut: such accommodations would violate the
136. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722 (relying on the Court's previous holding that a Connecticut law that
awarded Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work on their designated
Sabbath day was "invalid under the Establishment Clause because it 'unyielding[ly] weigh[ted]' the
interests of Sabbatarians 'over all other interests"') (citing Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703,
710 (1985)).
137. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014); Barber v. Bryant,
193 F. Supp. 3d. 677, 721-22 (S.D. Miss. 2016).
138. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
139. Id. at 2781 n. 37 (quoting Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720); Bryant, 193 F. Supp. 3d. at 721-22.
140. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
141. To be sure, some have argued against the existence of this principle. Brief for Constitutional
Law Scholars, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, supra note 6; see also Kevin C. Walsh, Did Justice Ginsburg
Endorse the Establishment Clause Third-Party Burdens Argument in Holt v. Hobbs?, MIRROR OF
Jusiici (Jan. 21, 2015), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2015/01/
did-justice-ginsburg-endorse-the-establishment-clause-third-party-burdens-argument-in-holt-v-hobbs-
.html ("I agree with Rick and Marc in rejecting the existence of a general rule that the Establishment
Clause prohibits RFRA- or RLUIPA-required accommodations that impose third-party
burdens . . .. "). However, given the Court's statement in Hobby Lobby and its decision in Estate of
Thornton, it is difficult to credit these views. It is certainly possible to disagree as to the scope and
reach of the "no third-party-harms" principle. Indeed, as I discuss infra, the Court has offered no clear
guidance, and scholars are hardly in agreement as to its scope and reach. But that the principle exists
seems by now beyond doubt. Bryant, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 721-22.
142. TEBBE, supra note 126, at 51 (emphasis in original).
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Establishment Clause because they obviously impose costs and harms on
third parties, namely.'43 However, this principle is not ironclad. The
Supreme Court has sometimes upheld religious accommodations even
when they do impose third party costs and harms.
For example, the federal government exempts people whose
religious beliefs forbid military service from mandatory military
service.T44 This accommodation still exists in the law, and the Supreme
Court has upheld it.T45 Yet it clearly exposes third parties to harm. If one
person is excused from mandatory military service, another will be
required to serve in his place."46
143. The children of those parents who claim the religious accommodation and the children of
other parents are both put at risk due to the erosion of herd immunity. See supra notes 33 39 and
accompanying text.
144. Timothy G. Todd, Religious and Conscientious Objection, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1734, 1734 (1969)
(citing the 1917 Draft Act, which exempted from combat service "member[s] of any well-recognized
religious sect or organization ... whose existing creed or principles forbid its members to participate in
war in any form.").
145. See Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. § 38060) (2014); United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163, 187 (1964) (upholding as constitutional an exemption from military training and service for
conscientious objectors that required "belief in relation to a Supreme Being" and interpreting the
exemption to include beliefs in "creative intelligence" and the "tremendous spiritual price man must
pay for his willingness to destroy human life"); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 343 (1969)
(finding that statements that the taking of a life is morally wrong along with beliefs held "with strength
of more traditional religious convictions" established plaintiff's right to a conscientious objector
exemption). Cf JAMES W. ToiliEsoN, Tiii STIENGTII NoT To FIGHT 6 (1993) (noting that 170,000
Vietnam draftees received conscientious objector deferments).
146. See BRIAN LiIITER, Wny TOiLRATl RIILIGION? 99 (2012) ("[i]f those with claims of conscience
against military duty are exempted from service, then the burden (and all the very serious risks) will
fall upon those who either have no conscientious objection or cannot successfully establish their
conscientious claim."). Some have claimed that this accommodation should be treated differently than
others that impose third party harms. For example, Tebbe proposes that "accommodating [religious]
objectors does not shift demonstrable harm to other draftees." Tunn, supra note 126 at 58; see also
Gedicks & Koppelman, supra note 124, at 57 (stating that, in the context of the religious pacifist
exemption, "[a]though whoever was drafted in place of the objectors faced the consequence of going
to war, the pre-existing probability of those persons' being drafted was not significantly increased by
the exemption"); Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 6, at 367 n. 114 (stating that the authors disagree
with other scholars who have asserted "that draft exemptions impose serious costs on third parties"
because "lilt seems unlikely that a decision to flee to Canada or go underground to evade the draft
during the Vietnam War would have been affected by knowledge that religious pacifists were
exempt.").
I find these arguments deeply unpersuasive. If a military requires ioo draftees, someone will
have to fill the spot of the accommodated religious objector. Being conscripted into military service is
its own harm for those who would not choose to volunteer, regardless of whether further harm ensues.
Moreover, the facts that (i) it may be difficult to identify with confidence the particular unlucky
individual who would not have been conscripted but for the accommodation of the religious objector,
or (2) that the overall odds of conscription are not meaningfully changed by the choice to
accommodate, ought to be irrelevant. The fact is that some person somewhere suffers a great deal of
harm-not to mention the potential of death because society has chosen to excuse another individual
on religious grounds. If we are to distinguish this case from those in which the accommodation is
prohibited, then we will need to find another basis for doing so.
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Likewise, when the government gives favorable tax treatment to
religious organizations,T47 that imposes costs on third parties.4 When the
government must raise revenue, reducing a religious entity's tax burden
necessarily results in someone else paying more.'49 Although the
Supreme Court has occasionally rejected some tax benefits granted to
religious organizations,"" in general these benefits have been upheld."'
Scholars point to other religious accommodations, which harm third
parties, but nonetheless are constitutional. For example, all fifty states
recognize a priest-penitent privilege against compelled testimony. 2 This
accommodation relieves a religious person from complying with an
otherwise-applicable law requiring those with material evidence to
testify. Further, it works to burden "the opposing party's right to the
admission of all potentially favorable evidence, and burdens the court's
quest for the truth."' Yet courts routinely apply this privilege, and
neither scholars nor judges have questioned its constitutionality. 54
147. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (exempting from the income tax organizations "operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific or [other] purposes"). For more on the history and
ubiquity of religious exemptions in the tax code, see Christine R. Moore, Religious Tax Exemption and
the 'Charitable Scrutiny' Test, 15 RIIGlNT U. L. RiXV. 295, 296-99 (2003) (discussing the long history of
religious tax exemptions in America and noting that "tax exemptions for religious institutions have
been continuous from colonial times to the present"); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
461 U.S. 574, 588-89 (1983) (asserting that "[t]ax exemptions for certain institutions thought beneficial
to the social order of the country as a whole, or to a particular community, are deeply rooted in our
history" and discussing century-old cases upholding such exemptions).
148. See Greenawalt, Establishment Clause Limits, supra note 5, at 354 (noting that
notwithstanding the disadvantages imposed on others by exemptions from sales taxes for religious
organizations, such exemptions have not been ruled unconstitutional on this basis); Gedicks &
Koppelman, supra note 124, at 56 (noting that the Court has not found property tax exemptions for
churches unconstitutional because it is not a religion-specific accommodation and "the incremental
increase in the pre-existing tax burden was spread among all owners of taxable property and did not
fall on a limited, narrow, and discrete class").
149. Id.
150. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 574 (holding that the IRS has discretion under the Internal Revenue
Code to deny tax-exempt status to a nonprofit private school that maintains a racially discriminatory
admission standard which it attributes to its religious doctrine); Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S.
I, 14 (1989) (invalidating under the Establishment Clause a state sales tax exemption for religious
publications because of the increased tax burden on secular publications).
151. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
152. See Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522, 1532 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that "[a]ll fifty states
have enacted statutes granting some form of testimonial privilege to clergy-communicant
communications.") (internal quotations omitted).
153. See Brief for Constitutional Law Scholars, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, supra note 6.
154. Id. at *15 (citing Mockaitis as support for the assertion that "courts routinely exclude from
evidence at trial the substance of communications between a member of the clergy and a parishioner"
despite the burden on the opposing party's right to potentially favorable evidence and the court's
quest for truth); see Mockaitis, 104 F.3d at 1532 ("Neither scholars nor courts question the legitimacy
of the [testimonial privilege to clergy communications1, and attorneys rarely litigate the issue.").
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What remains, then, is a classic line-drawing problem: sometimes a
law that imposes third party harms is unconstitutional, but sometimes it
is constitutional."' How to tell the difference?T" 6
C. THE LINE-DRAWING PROBLEM: SCHOLARS' PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The scholars who have addressed the line-drawing problem
generally call on courts to assess the magnitude of the third party
harms. 7 If the harms are too great, by some proposed metric, then the
religious accommodation is unconstitutional; if the harms are not too
great, then the accommodation is constitutional. As Greenawalt puts it,
"it is hard to understand the question of whether the burdens to be borne
by others are too great as anything other than a matter of degree.""
155. See Lund, supra note 4, at 1385 (asserting that more work is necessary on this question);
Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 6, at 362 ("Although there is broad consensus that the
Establishment Clause prohibits permissive accommodations that shift the costs of the accommodated
religious practices onto third parties, there is uncertainty about how weighty the shifted costs must be
before they trigger anti-establishment concerns.").
156. Scholars also debate a separate, though related, question: What is the proper baseline against
which to measure whether a religious accommodation relieves a burden in the first place? See Nelson
Tebbe, Micah Schwartzman, & Richard Schragger, When Do Religious Accommodations Burden
Others?, THE CONSCIENCE WARS: RETHINKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN RELIGION, IDENTITY, AND
EQUALITY (forthcoming 2017); Greenawalt, Establishment Clause Limits, supra note 5, at 349 (finding
that although "the Court has been right to insist that an accommodation must relieve some burden on
the exercise of religion... this conclusion alone does not settle the question of baselines"); see also
Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 6, at 371 ("Any argument about impermissible cost shifting must
identify the proper status quo ante as the baseline measure of whether and to what extent costs have
been shifted."); see also Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to
Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 6 (1989) ("To determine whether government action
has 'aided' or 'penalized' [religion in violation of the Establishment Clause,] one needs a baseline: 'aid'
or 'penalty' as compared to what?").
This issue was hotly contested in the context of the Hobby Lobby litigation. See e.g., Brief for
Constitutional Law Scholars, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, supra note 6; Brief for National Association of
Evangelicals as Amicus Curiae Supporting Hobby Lobby and Conestoga et al., Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356), 2014 WL 325703; see also Gedicks &
Koppelman, supra note 124, at 59-61; Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 6, at 371-72; Nelson Tebbe,
Richard Schragger, & Micah Schwartzman, Hobby Lobby and the Establishment Clause, Part II: What
Counts as a Burden on Employees?, BAIKINIZAION (Dec. 4, 2013, 6:04 PM),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2o3/12/hobby-lobby-and-establishment-clause.html; Eugene Volokh, 3B.
Would Granting an Exemption from the Employer Mandate Violate the Establishment Clause?, Tmi
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 4, 2013, 5:11 PM), http://volokh.com/2013/I2/o4/3b-granting-exemption-
employer-mandate-violate-establishment-clause/; Marc DeGirolami, On the Claim that Exemptions
from the Mandate Violate the Establishment Clause, MIRROR 01 JusTICI (Dec. 5, 2013),
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjusticC/2o3/12/Cxemptions-from-the-mandate-do-not-violate-
the-establishment-clause.html. This question, though quite important, is beyond the scope of this
Article, which focuses on cases in which a concrete harm is clear.
157. Tebbe also proposes a distinction between religious accommodations that impose burdens on
"the public" and those that impose burdens on private individuals, finding only the latter
constitutionally problematic. Tebbe, supra note 126, at 50. I find this perplexing, because a burden
borne by "the public" is actually a burden borne by the individual citizens who make up the public.
158. Greenawalt, Establishment Clause Limits, supra note 5, at 354.
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Thus, "[while a] slight cost borne by private individuals will not violate
the Establishment Clause, a heavy cost will amount to an advancement
of religion at the expense of other interests."" 9
The Supreme Court has hinted toward this approach. As Gedicks
and Van Tassell note, the Court suggested in Caldor that the
Establishment Clause concern is triggered when the imposition on third
parties is "'significant' and 'substantial."'o Gedicks and Van Tassell
canvas several cases and suggest that these terms mean that the
imposition on third parties must be more than "marginally increased"
due to the religious accommodation."' For instance, the "additional
burden imposed by accommodating religious pacifists [by exempting
them from the military draft] . . . is barely measurable; those
accommodated are so few compared to the entire population subjected
to the law that it is not reasonable to understand the exemption as a
meaningful third party burden.".
Gedicks and Van Tassell go on to propose that, in determining
whether the third party harm caused by a religious accommodation is
"significant and substantial," the Court should consider materiality as the
"organizing principle."' That is, if reasonable third parties would
consider the religious accommodation "relevant to [their own]
decisions ... in some relevant way," then the Establishment Clause is
violated."' If a reasonable third party would not consider the costs of the
religious accommodation as material to his own decisions, then the
accommodation does not violate the Establishment Clause."
Tebbe, Schragger, and Schwartzman similarly call on courts to
measure the magnitude of the harm to third parties, but they offer a
slightly different test for resolving the line-drawing problem. Borrowing
from jurisprudence developed in the related context of Title VII's
religious accommodation provision, they suggest that if the harm to third
parties caused by a religious accommodation is more than de minimis,
then the accommodation is unconstitutional.T6 6 Although this proposed
159. Id.
16o. Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 6, at 363 n. 92 (quoting Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472
U.S. 703, 709 (1985) ("There is no exception when honoring the dictates of Sabbath observers would
cause the employer substantial economic burdens or when the employer's compliance would require
the imposition of significant burdens on other employees required to work in place of the Sabbath
observers." (emphasis in original)).
161. Id. at 363-65.
162. Id. at 364; Gedicks & Koppelman, supra note 124, at 57 (stating that, in the context of the
religious pacifist exemption, "[a]lthough whoever was drafted in place of the objectors faced the
consequence of going to war, the pre-existing probability of those persons' being drafted was not
significantly increased by the exemption.").
163. Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 6, at 366.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Nelson Tebbe et al., How Much May Religious Accommodations Burden Others?, in LAW,
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de minimis standard may initially seem quite unforgiving to religious
accommodations, they suggest that it actually allows for more
accommodations than does the materiality standard suggested by
Gedicks and Van Tassell, which "may prohibit religious accommodations
in situations where the burden on religion is relatively severe, but the
effect on third parties is relatively slight."1r6 7
Canvassing Supreme Court and lower court opinions in the Title
VII context, Tebbe, Schragger, and Schwartzman suggest that the term
de minimis operationalizes Title VII's requirement that a religious
accommodation not impose an "undue" or "unreasonable" burden on
the employer or third parties. 6 8 Under this standard, determining
whether a third party burden is unconstitutional requires a "context-
specific [inquiry that] ... [will look at both] the fact and the magnitude of
[the] alleged [hardship]."T 69
By contrast, Jonathan Nuechterlein offers what appears at first to be
an altogether different approach to the line-drawing problem.70
According to Nuechterlein, the problem with religious accommodations
that impose third party harms is that they evince a legislative purpose to
advance religious interests, which is prohibited by the Establishment
Clause.T7 Consequently, the relevant inquiry to resolve the line-drawing
problem lies in determining the legislature's purpose. If the purpose was
to advance religious interests, then the accommodation is
unconstitutional. But if the purpose was to accommodate religious
interests "out of secular respect," then the accommodation is
constitutional. 72 When assessing the legislative purpose behind any
particular accommodation, Nuechterlein would require courts to assess
the degree of the burden that the accommodation places on third parties.
As he puts it, "[t]o manifest a legitimate purpose, an accommodation
statute must take the secular consequences of accommodation into
account. If those consequences are great, the legislature cannot, in
constitutional good faith, make the accommodation." 73
The primary difference between Nuechterlein's proposed approach
and those of other scholars is that Nuechterlein sees the magnitude of the
burden as a proxy for the legislature's purpose,T74 whereas others see the
RELIGION, AND HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES (Elizabeth Sepper et al. eds., forthcoming 2017).
167. Id. at 8 ("Even though the Supreme Court's de minimis interpretation of the undue hardship
standard sounds compromising, it has in fact been applied in ways that are more balanced.").
E68. Id.
169. Id. at 9.
170. Jonathan E. Nucchterlcin, The Free Exercise Boundaries of Permissible Accommodation
Under the Establishment Clause, 99 YAI1 L.J. 1127, 1142(1990).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1142-43.
173. Id. at 1143.
174. Id. ("Thus, when a legislature goes far out of its way to accommodate religion, ignoring all
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magnitude of the burden as independently decisive on the constitutional
question. As a practical matter, though, all three approaches require
courts to assess the degree of the burden placed on third parties as a
means of determining the constitutionality of a religious accommodation.
Each of these proposals finds support in at least some judicial
doctrine and dicta. As Greenawalt notes, the Supreme Court's use of the
terms "substantial" and "significant" implies that an assessment of the
magnitude of the third party harm is in order. Gedicks and Van Tassell's
proposed materiality test draws on familiar common law doctrine to give
content to the terms "substantial" and "significant," while the de minimis
test favored by Tebbe, Schragger, and Schwartzman draws on judicial
opinions from the related Title VII context to the same end.
Nuechterlein's focus on the legislature's purpose, on the other hand, is in
line with a great deal of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, beginning
with the familiar Lemon test.75 At the very least, then, these approaches
are tethered to judicial doctrine and dicta, and their familiarity suggests a
degree of workability.
However, these approaches also share an important weakness: they
call on judges to make assessments that they are not institutionally well-
suited to make. Greenawalt and Nuechterlein offer little direction for
assessing significance and substantiality. Although the proponents of the
materiality and de minimis tests offer somewhat more, these tests are
also highly subjective. The proposed materiality test for giving meaning
to these terms requires courts to engage in the notoriously malleable
(even if familiar) "reasonable person" inquiry."' The alternative de
minimis test similarly invites courts to make highly context-specific
judgments about the magnitude of the harm. Although its proponents
assert that courts have done an admirable job of applying this inquiry
sensibly, they offer little by way of substantive guidance. Claiming that
courts have been "sensible" also begs the basic questions: sensible to
whom, and according to what measure? Moreover, the de minimis test
seems to call on courts to balance the harms of accommodation against
the burden to the religious individual in the event of non-
accommodation.7 7 This would apparently invite courts to assess the
burdensomeness of a state intrusion on a religious practice, a highly
kinds of other concerns, one may infer that it acts not simply out of respect, but also to please God.").
175. Id. at i 131-32 (focusing on Step i of the Lemon test). Also, some have argued that the Lemon
test is in decline or has been substantially reshaped in practice in more recent years. See Carl H.
Esbeck, The Lemon Test: Should It Be Retained, Reformulated or Rejected, 4 NOIRE DAME J.L. Eniics
& PUB. POL'y 513 (2014).
176. See, e.g., Mayo Moran, The Reasonable Person: A Conceptual Biography in Comparative
Perspective, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1233, 1235-37 (2010).
177. After all, its proponents assert that their approach is preferable to the materiality test because
it would permit "religious accommodations in situations where the burden on religion is relatively
severe, but the effect on third parties is relatively slight." Tebbe et al., supra note 166, at 2.
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problematic undertaking.7S In the end, according to all of these
approaches, what constitutes an intolerable third party harm may lie in
the eye of the beholder.T79
To appreciate these problems, consider the difficulty of applying
these tests in the case of non-vaccination. On the one hand, non-
vaccination increases the risk of contracting serious diseases. Some
people may choose not to live in communities with low vaccination rates
to avoid exposing themselves and their children to an increased risk of
infection. This suggests the materiality test is met. On the other hand,
because most people are vaccinated, the absolute risk of contracting
these diseases remains quite low, and even those children who are not
vaccinated against these diseases will probably not contract them. Given
the relative rarity of infection, is it objectively reasonable to make
decisions about where to live based on these religious accommodations,
or is it an overreaction due to the cognitive biases that make it difficult
for people to properly assess and respond to risks?"o After all, the same
people might readily subject themselves and their children to vastly
greater risks without a second thought."'
The alternative de minimis test provides similarly scant guidance for
how it might apply in the case of non-vaccination. Further, if judges must
balance these risks against the burden that mandatory vaccination would
place on religious objectors, it is difficult to know where to begin. That is,
without engaging in intra-religious theological inquiries-which courts
are forbidden to undertake-how can the burden that vaccination would
impose on the religious faith of those who oppose it be quantified?
We can do better, at least in some kinds of cases. There is a
potential line-drawing test that would provide greater direction and
certainty in some cases-and would readily resolve the problem of
religious accommodations in the context of mandatory vaccination.
III. ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS
THAT IMPOSE THIRD PARTY HARMS:
AN EQUALITY APPROACH
This Part proposes a test for assessing the constitutionality of
religious accommodations that impose third party harms, what I call an
Equality approach to the problem. Under this approach, religious
178. See, e.g., Michael A. Helfand, Identifying Substantial Burdens, 2016 U. Ii,. L. Rvv. 1771, 1799
(2016).
179. Chris Lund has likewise suggested that more work is to be done on this question, but that any
approach will entail some balancing of harms. Lund, supra note 4, at 1381-82.
i8o. See, e.g., Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCIENCE, 1124-31 (1974).
181. For example, ninety-five percent of parents fail to practice car seat safety for newborns.
Benjamin D. Hoffman, Adrienne R. Gallardo, & Kathleen F. Carlson, Unsafe from the Start: Serious
Misuse of Car Safety Seats at Newborn Discharge, 171 J. PEDIATRICS 48-54 (2016).
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accommodations that impose third party harms are presumptively
constitutional only if the legislature also offers accommodations for those
with nonreligious needs and objections.
I first lay out the Equality approach, demonstrate how it accounts
for the cases, and describe its normative framework. I then consider
additional benefits and some limits of the approach.
A. UNDERSTANDING THE EQUALITY APPROACH: BACKGROUND AND
FRAMEWORK
The line-drawing problem posed by the Establishment Clause's "no
third party harms principle" nearly mirrors another, more familiar line-
drawing problem that arises in the Free Exercise Clause context.
Whereas the Establishment Clause provides an upper limit on the ability
of the legislature to accommodate religious beliefs and practices, the
Free Exercise Clause sets a floor for when religious accommodations are
constitutionally required. The Court has developed a useful test for
analyzing Free Exercise claims that could be adapted for the
Establishment Clause context.
i. The Lukumi Paradigm: When the Free Exercise Clause Requires
Religious Accommodations
In Employment Division v. Smith, the Court held that the Free
Exercise Clause does not typically require religious accommodations to
neutral, generally-applicable laws."' Thus, Native Americans who
smoked peyote for religious purposes were entitled to no religious
accommodation from laws that prohibited and penalized the use of
peyote for all purposes.' By the same token, laws that are not neutral or
generally applicable, but that specifically target religious practices, are
constitutionally problematic.
The Court elaborated on this principle in Church of Lukumi Babalu
Aye v. City of Hialeah."' There, the Court considered a facially neutral
local ordinance that prohibited animal sacrifice."' If this ban were truly
neutral and generally applicable, then it would survive constitutional
scrutiny. However, because the ordinance was directed at, and only
applied to, adherents of Santeria, the Court struck it down."' The ban did
not prohibit people from killing animals for reasons other than
182. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1989) ("[TIhe right of free exercise does not relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).")
(internal quotations omitted).
183. Id. at 890.
184. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
185. Id. at 526-28.
186. Id. at 531-35.
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ceremonial sacrifice,& and the record was replete with evidence that the
ordinance was targeted at, and motivated by, animus towards
practitioners of Santeria."' Thus, under Lukumi, if a law singles out a
religious practice for condemnation, while permitting parallel
nonreligious practices, then the statute violates the Free Exercise Clause.
To further understand the Lukumi test, consider the Third Circuit's
opinion striking down the application of a facially neutral ordinance to a
religious group in Tenafly Eruv Association v. Borough of Tenafly."' A
local ordinance in Tenafly, New Jersey, prohibited the attachment of any
objects to utility poles located in the public right of way.'o Based on this
facially neutral ordinance, Tenafly prohibited an Orthodox Jewish group
from attaching small posts to utility poles that would have facilitated
religious practice."' However, the Third Circuit struck down Tenafly's
action because the Borough had regularly allowed nonreligious groups to
attach materials to utility poles., 2 Because the Borough accommodated
nonreligious groups but not similarly-situated religious groups, it violated
the Free Exercise Clause. '
Lukumi and its progeny, amplifying Smith, thus created a
line-drawing test to resolve the question of when religious
accommodations are constitutionally mandatory.'9 4  When the
government allows people to engage in particular practices for some
nonreligious reasons, it must also allow those with parallel religious
reasons to engage in the same practices. 5
187. Id. at 528.
188. Id. at 528, 534-35.
189. Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2002). For extensive
discussion of this case, see Levin, supra note 95, at 1631-35.
190. Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc., 309 F.3d at 151 ("No person shall place any sign or advertisement, or
other matter upon any pole, tree, curbstone, sidewalk or elsewhere, in any public street or public
place, excepting such as may be authorized by this or any other ordinance of the Borough.") (quoting
TENAFLY, N.J., ORDINANCE 691, art. VIII( 7 ) (1954)).
191. Id. at 152-54.
192. Id. at 155.
193. Id. at 165-74.
194. Note that the Free Exercise Clause also requires accommodations in some other cases. Most
obviously, in Hosanna-Tabor Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause creates a ministerial exception that exempts
religious organizations from generally-applicable non-discrimination laws when it comes to the
employment of religious ministers. 565 U.S. 171, 173 (2012). Such additional Free Exercise protections
are unrelated to the Smith-Lukumi line of cases and do not speak to the line-drawing problem
discussed herein.
195. See, e.g., Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc., 3o9 F.3d at 165-74; Fraternal Order of Police Newark
v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
2. The Equality Approach: When the Establishment Clause
Prohibits Religious Accommodations
As the first step in assessing whether a religious accommodation
that imposes third party harms violates the Establishment Clause, courts
should invert the Lukumi test and apply a similar equality framework. If
a statute offers only religious accommodations that impose third party
harms, then it presumptively violates the Establishment Clause. If it
offers both religious accommodations and other kinds of
accommodations, then it is presumptively constitutional.
No court has explicitly applied this test to determine whether a
religious accommodation that imposes third party harms violates the
Establishment Clause. However, this test accounts for all of the Supreme
Court cases that address the issue. The Court has never struck down a
religious accommodation on the grounds that it imposes third party
harms where the statute also provided parallel nonreligious
accommodations. Conversely, it has never upheld a religious
accommodation that imposes third party harms without a parallel
nonreligious accommodation.
Compare, for example, the religious accommodation struck down in
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor" with the constitutionally permissible
religious accommodation in the context of the military draft.' Both of
these statutes imposed third party harms, but one failed the Equality test,
whereas the other passed it. In Caldor, the Court struck down a
Connecticut statute that gave each employee the right to take a day off
from work on his or her Sabbath, because that imposed the cost of a
religious observance on nonreligious employers and co-workers."' The
statute gave no similar right to select a day off from work for
nonreligious reasons. The holding strongly implies that if the statute had
allowed all employees to select a day off from work, it would have been
constitutional.
In contrast, the religious accommodation that exempts religious
objectors from military service is paralleled by nonreligious
accommodations and exemptions, and is therefore constitutional. Indeed,
the Court extended the exemption to nonreligious conscientious
objectors, apparently in order to save the religious accommodation from
being struck down on Establishment Clause grounds."' In addition, some
elected officials, as well as those who can demonstrate that military
service will impose a hardship on their dependents are exempt from
196. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (For further discussion on this case, see
supra note 130 and accompanying text).
197. As noted supra, this is among the most well-entrenched religious accommodations, and no
one seriously doubts its constitutionality.
198. Caldor, 472 U.S. at 709-1L
199. TEBBE, supra note 126, at Chapter 3.
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service. Students and some immigrants and dual nationals can receive
deferments.o
The Equality test also accounts for the Court's decisions concerning
tax exemptions for religious groups. As noted previously, favorable tax
treatment means others must make up for the forgone revenue by paying
higher taxes.2o' The Court has variously struck down and upheld these
accommodations. On the one hand, in Texas Monthly v. Bullock, the
Court struck down a state provision that exempted religious publications
from otherwise applicable sales and use taxes2o On the other hand, in
Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York, the Court upheld a
property tax exemption for properties owned by religious nonprofit
organizations.2o The difference between these cases is clear under an
Equality analysis. In Bullock, the favorable tax treatment was only
available to purveyors of religious publications. In Walz, however, the
favorable treatment was available to a host of non-profit organizations,
religious or not.2 4 The statute in Bullock failed the Equality test, whereas
the statute in Walz passed it.
The importance of this difference was made explicit by the plurality
in Bullock. Distinguishing Bullock from Walz, the opinion emphasizes
that the tax benefits in Walz "flowed to a large number of nonreligious
groups as well. Indeed, were those benefits confined to religious
organizations ... we would not have hesitated to strike them
down . ... ."' Later in its opinion, the plurality held that, when a
legislature "directs a subsidy exclusively to religious organizations [and
thereby] . . .burdens nonbeneficiaries markedly," it violates the
Establishment Clause.2o In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor
noted the complicated relationship between the Free Exercise value of
accommodating religion and the competing Establishment Clause value
that prohibits certain kinds of government support for religion. She
suggested that the state could resolve the tension between the two
clauses by adopting a tax exemption that applies to "the sale not only of
religious literature distributed by a religious organization but also of
philosophical literature distributed by nonreligious organizations.,2o" This
comment implicitly anticipates both Lukumi and the proposed Equality
test. That is, per Lukumi, a state would run afoul of the Free Exercise
200. Postponements, Deferments, Exemptions, SE 1n1ViE SFRv. Sys., https://www.sss.gov/About/
Return-to-the-Draft/Postponements-Deferments-Exemptions (last visited Aug. 5, 2017).
201. See supra notes 148-152 and accompanying text.
202. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. I, 25 (1989).
203. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 667 (1970).
204. This is generally the case with tax provisions that benefit religious groups, which may explain
why the Court generally upholds these statutes. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).
205. Bullock, 489 U.S. at 11-12.
206. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
207. Id. at 27 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Clause if it offered a tax exemption for philosophical literature without
also offering an exemption for religious literature that addresses similar
ideas. Per the Equality test, the Establishment Clause does not allow the
state to limit a tax exemption for "the sale of religious literature by
religious organizations.""o
Note that the Equality approach does not require absolute
neutrality between religion and non-religion. It has no applicability when
religious accommodations do not impose third party harms. If there are
no third party harms, legislators and other government actors can grant
preferential treatment to religious practitioners without offering parallel
accommodations to nonreligious groups. Lukumi applies to protect
religious practices in every context; the Equality test only applies where
there are third party harms. For example, the military can allow religious
practitioners to wear religious headwear' 9 without simultaneously
permitting nonreligious skullcap-lovers to do the same. Under Lukumi,
however, it cannot do the reverse. This point reflects the Court's
insistence that the religion clauses do permit a degree of religious
exceptionalism in the granting of accommodations."
3. Appropriate Remedies Under the Equality Approach
When a court applies the Equality approach and finds that a statute
is unconstitutional, it should strike down the religious accommodation,
rather than expand it to those who seek nonreligious philosophical
accommodations. There are three reasons to apply this remedy. First, the
suit would be a facial challenge to the religious accommodations regime,
brought by a party who is in a position to suffer harm as a result (such as
a person who cannot be vaccinated for medical reasons). The relief most
calibrated to remedy that harm is to eliminate, rather than expand, the
accommodation. Second, as discussed below, one of the reasons that
courts should act in this case is to reverse the burden of legislative inertia
and allow the legislature to reconsider the question of whether the
exemption should exist. The most effective way to do that is to create a
blank canvas for legislators to work from, instead of defaulting to an
even broader exemption. Third, and most important, by providing
religious accommodations and not philosophical ones, state legislatures
tacitly reject the approach of sister states that have adopted broader
philosophical accommodations. They could have explicitly allowed for a
broader scheme, but chose not to. Courts would do violence to the
statute's plain meaning and the legislature's apparent intent if it ignored
this choice in favor of expanding the accommodation. By striking down
208. Id. at 28.
209. This imposes no third party harms, see supra note 124 and accompanying text.
210. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
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statutes that only provide religious accommodations regime, the courts
would give state legislatures a choice: reenact it with a parallel
philosophical accommodation or provide no accommodations at all.
B. NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR, AND PROMISE AND LIMITS OF, THE
EQUALITY APPROACH
Having laid out the Equality approach and shown how it accounts
for the cases, it is worth considering why it makes normative sense, as
well as its broader potential promise and important limits.
I. Normative Justifications for the Equality Approach
Why does it make sense that a religious accommodation that is
matched by a parallel, nonreligious accommodation is absolved of
Establishment Clause concerns? If the problem with religious
accommodations that impose third party harms is that they impose costs
on non-consenting third parties, then it should not make a difference if
the government extends that permission to people with nonreligious
reasons to impose such costs. The injured third party is a victim of
government sanction of religious practice regardless of whether or not
the government also sanctions similar nonreligious practices. Treating
religious and nonreligious institutions alike does not eliminate
Establishment Clause concerns in other contexts, after all. For example,
the government could directly give unrestricted funds to a private,
nonreligious school, but giving the same type of unrestricted funding to a
religious school would still violate the Establishment Clause. So in the
context of religious accommodations that impose third party harms, why
does granting parallel nonreligious accommodations eliminate the
Establishment Clause problem?
There are three complementary answers to this question. First, the
interplay between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment
Clause is unique in the context of accommodations. As discussed
previously, under Smith and Lukumi, once the government offers a
nonreligious accommodation, the Free Exercise Clause may require it to
offer a parallel religious accommodation."' As already noted, the
211. Courts and scholars are split concerning the exact circumstances in which a non-religious
accommodation necessarily triggers a government responsibility to offer a religious accommodation.
Compare Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir. 2004) ("The categorical exemptions in
34 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2965(a) for zoos and 'nationally recognized circuses' likewise trigger strict
scrutiny because at least some of the exemptions available under this provision undermine the
interests served by the fee provision to at least the same degree as would an [religious I exemption."),
with Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 701-02 (9th Cir. 1999)
("Underinclusiveness is not in and of itself a talisman of constitutional infirmity; rather, it is significant
only insofar as it indicates something more sinister."), vacated on other grounds, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th
Cir. 2000); see also Oleske, Jr., supra note i io, at 295 (2013) (comparing different approaches to the
Lukumi line-drawing question). This issue is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is worth noting
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Establishment Clause cannot prohibit that which the Free Exercise
Clause requires. This is not the case with other Establishment Clause
cases, where the Free Exercise Clause is not pertinent. For example, the
Free Exercise Clause gives no support to a claim for government funding
of a religious school. But in the context of accommodations, both religion
clauses are in play. One way to respect both clauses is to adopt both
Lukumi and the Equality approach.
A second normative argument in favor of the Equality approach is
to view it simply as a useful proxy or heuristic for determining what
constitutes a "significant" or "substantial" third party harm. As already
discussed, one of the difficulties with current approaches is that they
require judges to assess whether a harm is "significant" or "substantial"
enough to violate the Establishment Clause, an assessment judges are
not well-equipped to make . The Equality approach offers a way for
judges to reason through the issue in a manner that reflects courts'
institutional competencies: by making apples-to-apples, comparisons" 3 If
the law offers nonreligious accommodations that risk imposing a
particular harm, it follows that the force behind the law has decided that
this harm is not so serious that it must always be prevented. Thus, it does
not violate the Establishment Clause when it accommodates religious
practices that impose the same kind of risk of harm. The Equality
approach thus serves as a shorthand tool for assessing the magnitude of
the harm.
Third, if Jonathan Nuechterlein's interpretation of Caldor and the
"no third party harms" principle is correct,"' then the Equality approach
makes intuitive sense. Recall that Nuechterlein proposes that a religious
accommodation that imposes third party harms may violate the
Establishment Clause because it is evidence of an impermissible
legislative purpose to promote religion2" But if the legislature also
grants nonreligious accommodations, then there is no reason to believe
that it intends to promote religion."' Instead, its manifest purpose is to
respect any people for whom the practice is especially important,
whether for religious or other reasons.
that even if the Free Exercise Clause does not necessarily require a religious accommodation in a case
in which a specific non-religious accommodation has been granted, the values embedded in the Free
Exercise Clause suggest a general tolerance for religious accommodations.
212. See, e.g., Emp't. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886-87 (1990) (discussing the difficulties
associated with assigning to judges such tasks).
213. See Levin, supra note 95, at 1683 (discussing the relative competencies of judges in this
context).
214. See supra note 170 (discussing Nuechterlein's approach).
215. Id.
216. Id.
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2. The Broader Promise of the Equality Approach
The Equality approach accounts for the relevant cases, makes sense
of both religion clauses in a theoretically coherent manner, and avoids
forcing judges to make difficult substantive assessments of the potential
for third party harm.
More broadly, the equality approach may offer greater potential for
our contemporary moment and political system. A defining feature of
our political system, and one that carries with it substantial dangers, is
the prevalence of interest group politics. Political scientists have shown
that small groups representing small fractions of the electorate enjoy
outsize influence and can protect their interests at the expense of the
majority's." This is because insular groups may be cohesive,
well-organized, and highly motivated to lobby for a particular issue.2" In
contrast, large majorities may be disbursed, disorganized, and not
focused on the particular issue."' Consequently, religious groups (like
other interest groups) command attention from politicians and maintain
disproportionate political clout.22'
Of course, religious groups do not always see their interests
vindicated. Social majorities and competing interest groups can and do
defeat minority religious groups, just as they defeat other minority
groups.22' As I argue elsewhere, the Lukumi test is one means of
combating the problem of majoritarianism that victimizes small religious
groups.2 However, Lukumi only protects religious groups from the
tyranny of the majority, or from competing interest groups that succeed
in protecting their own interests at the expense of religious practices. It
cannot protect others from the tyranny of religious groups.223 Under
Lukumi, religious groups get at least as much accommodation as others,
and can externalize the costs of religious accommodation. But other
217. See Levin, supra note 95, at 1661-69 (discussing public choice dynamics in the context of
religious accommodationism); see also DANIIA, A. FARBER & PIip P. FRICKY, LAW & PuBlIC CIIoIci:
A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 23 (1991) (explaining how the "free rider" problem allows small interest
groups to dominate the political discourse); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent
Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J. L. & ECON. 875 (1975).
218. See Levin, supra note 95, at 1662-23.
219. Id.; see also Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. RiTV. 1007, 1051 (201 i)
("Generally, public-choice theory posits that small groups are successful at obtaining legislation
because they are more interested and more easily organized than the general public-each member of
which bears only a small cost of the interest-group legislation.").
22o. Levin, supra note 95 at 1642-57, 1661-69 (discussing and debunking the conventionallintuitive
approach that small religious groups have relatively little power with evidence and theory to the
contrary).
221. Id. at 1664-67 (addressing the conditions in which religious interest groups may be defeated in
the political branches).
222. Id. at 1669-76.
223. Id. at 1651-56, 1682 (discussing the problem of over-accommodation of religious interests and
a one-way ratchet).
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groups are promised no accommodation and no protection from costs
imposed by religious accommodation. Privileging religious groups in this
way also facilitates their political isolation. There may be less of a need
to build coalitions with other groups, because Lukumi can serve as a
powerful weapon to wield in courts.
The Equality approach offers a way to change these dynamics by
limiting the circumstances in which religious groups can advance their
own, and only their own, agendas. Religious groups would not be able to
act alone to protect their own religious interests in the political arena.
Even if they win narrow religious accommodations, those
accommodations would be struck down by courts if they impose third
party harms and are not matched by comparable nonreligious
accommodations. Working in tandem, then, Lukumi and the Equality
approach could balance the scales by either guaranteeing
accommodations that apply both to the traditionally religious and the
nonreligious, or removing those harmful accommodations altogether.
Religious and nonreligious interest groups would therefore be
incentivized to work together politically to secure their own interests.2 4
One practical example of the power of such coalition building is the
agreement between the Mormon Church and proponents of gay rights in
Utah regarding the extension of anti-discrimination protections to gays
and lesbians.7' The Mormon hierarchy, perhaps recognizing that the tide
of public opinion has turned in favor of gay rights, 6 agreed to support
anti-discrimination legislation protecting gays and lesbians . In return
for this support, advocates of non-discrimination agreed to
accommodations that would exempt objecting religious clerks from being
required to facilitate same-sex weddings . In other words, by
recognizing the changing political dynamic and working together, both
interest groups were able to achieve beneficial results that neither may
have won alone. To the extent that the Equality approach encourages
similar coalition-building among interest groups by requiring either
broad accommodations or none at all, it would benefit all stakeholders.
224. See supra text accompanying note 211. It is worth reiterating that religious groups still enjoy
special treatment in the accommodations context in that they can be the sole beneficiaries of
accommodations that do not impose third party harms. In this way, Lukumi and the Equality
approach are not fully equivalent. Lukumi applies to protect religious practices in every context;
whereas the Equality test only applies where there are third party harms.
225. Niraj Chokshi, Gay Rights, Religious Rights and a Compromise in an Unlikely Place: Utah,
THE WASHINGTON PosT (Apr. 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
gay-rights-religious-rights-and-a-compromise-in-an-unlikely-place-utah/2015/04/12/.
226. See, e.g., Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, PEw RESEARCH CENTER (May 12, 2016),
http://www.pewforum.org/20 I6/o5/I2/changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/; Lydia Wheeler, Poll: Seven
in io Support LGBT Nondiscrimination Laws, THE HILL (July i, 2015, 3:o6 PM),
http://thchill.com/regulation/246683-poIl-7-in-io-americans-support-lght-nondiscrimination-laws.
227. Chokshi, supra note 225.
228. Id.
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3. The Limits of the Equality Approach
The Equality approach to the problem of third party harms is not a
panacea. It will not resolve all disputes concerning the constitutionality
of religious accommodations that impose third party harms. There are
two important questions that the Equality approach alone cannot
answer.
First, what qualifies as a third party harm? Recall that the
Establishment Clause problem-and therefore the Equality solution-is
only present where a religious accommodation imposes legally
cognizable harms on third parties.2 Consequently, it is necessary to
identify what constitutes a third party harm that triggers the Equality
inquiry. This question has received considerable scholarly attention and
remains contentious. 23 ' The Equality approach has little to say about this
question. Although it can be a proxy to help quantify that magnitude of
the harm, 3 ' it cannot tell us what constitutes a legally cognizable third
party harm that triggers the Establishment Clause inquiry.
Second, the Equality approach requires courts to ask whether
accommodations that impose third party harms are accompanied by
similar nonreligious accommodations. However, it may be difficult to
make this kind of apples-to-apples comparison. In this sense, the
Equality approach suffers the same limitation as Lukumi: sometimes it is
not self-evident whether a religious accommodation and a given
nonreligious accommodation are similar enough to be compared to
assess constitutionality. In the Free Exercise context, where Lukumi
applies, this question is the subject of significant debate among scholars
and judges.3 How great does the secular exception have to be before
there is an obligation to provide a parallel religious accommodation?
And what does it mean for the religious and nonreligious
accommodations to be parallel?
The Equality approach invites similar questions, and there is room
for debate and further consideration of this question. For now, it is
sufficient to note that the Lukumi inquiry has proven helpful in many
cases even without a definitive answer to this question.23' The same is
229. See supra PARt II.A, II.B.
23o. For a thoughtful discussion of this question, see TEBBE, supra note 126, at 59-60.
231. See supra note 213 and accompanying text. For the most recent and most thoughtful
discussion of this issue, see Tebbe, Schwartzman, & Schragger, supra note 156.
232. See supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text.
233. It is difficult to assess exactly how many or what percentage of requested religious
accommodations are clearly resolved by Lukumi without raising this difficult question. Many or most
instances in which the apples-to-apples comparison between a requested religious accommodation and
a parallel non-religious accommodation is self-evident may never be the subject of lawsuits. That is,
after Lukumi, policymakers are aware that the Free Exercise Clause requires them to extend religious
exceptions if they are already creating similar non-religious exceptions, and they act accordingly.
Therefore, the difficult cases-those that develop into lawsuits may be those in which the
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true for the Equality inquiry. It is easy to identify parallel secular
accommodations to situations like religious exemptions from military
service, religious tax exemptions, and religious "day of rest" provisions.
As discussed in Part IV, the question of religious accommodations in the
context of vaccination mandates is one such case.
The Equality approach has important limits. It will not resolve every
challenge to religious accommodations that may impose third party
harms, and scholars and judges will require additional or alternative
modes of analysis in some cases. But a legal test need not resolve every
possible question in order to be useful. The Equality approach resolves
some questions, limits the universe of unresolved cases, and may provide
some guidance even in those cases that it does not resolve. In the case of
the mandatory vaccination regimes specifically, it is dispositive.
IV. APPLYING THE EQUALITY APPROACH TO RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS
FOR MANDATORY VACCINATION PROGRAMS
Having laid out the proposed approach to religious accommodations
that impose third party harms, we can now apply it in the context of
mandatory vaccination programs. Because this analysis suggests that
some religious accommodation schemes are unconstitutional, and
therefore open to legal challenge, it is also worth considering the
potential value and possible risks of a legal challenge.
A. THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
As noted previously, forty-seven states offer non-medical
accommodations to vaccination statutes.234 The majority only allow for
religious accommodations, while eighteen allow for both religious and
philosophical accommodations. 3 ' Applying the Equality approach, the
states in the former category violate the Establishment Clause; whereas
those in the latter do not.
The twenty-nine states that allow for only religious accommodations
to otherwise-mandatory vaccination regimes: (i) impose a mandatory
vaccination requirement that requires all parents to vaccinate their
children; 3'(2) only accommodate parents with religious objections; and
(3) in doing so harm on third parties by increasing the risk they will
contract deadly diseases, as well as be excluded from school in the event
of a disease outbreak. More broadly, in the event of a disease outbreak,
society as a whole bears the associated financial and social costs.
comparison is not self-evident.
234. See supra PART. I.B.
235. See supra PART. I.B.
236. Except for those for whom the vaccination is itself physically dangerous, and thereby
undermines the very goal of vaccination, see supra PART. I.B.
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Therefore, under the Equality approach, these statutes would be
unconstitutional.
However, the eighteen states that provide both religious and
philosophical accommodations that relieve parents from vaccinating
their children do not violate the Establishment Clause. In these states,
the religious accommodations pass the Equality test because they are
accompanied by parallel secular accommodations. The choice to grant
both religious and secular accommodations may not be wise, but it is not
unconstitutional.
B. THE NECESSITY OF JUDICIAL ACTION
Since non-vaccinators are a minority in this country, it might be
reasonable to ask why courts should address the problem of religious-
based opposition to vaccination at all.3 Why not proceed through
ordinary political and legislative channels, where those who oppose
religious accommodations can defeat the small minority who approve of
such accommodations without resort to the courts and Constitution?
This question may be framed in two ways. It could be a purely
descriptive question: why do forty-seven states tolerate religious
accommodations if they present these risks and are opposed by the
majority of citizens? Why have they not followed California2" and
revoked these accommodations legislatively?
The question could also be posed as a normative challenge to the
Equality approach. One leading Constitutional theory suggests that
judicial enforcement of the Bill of Rights should primarily be used as a
means for protecting minority groups from the political majorities that
would otherwise dominate them.3 In the context of vaccination, though,
the judiciary and the Establishment Clause would work to protect
majority interests, at the expense of vulnerable minorities. Is that a
reasonable use of our judiciary? After all, political majorities are
opposed to such accommodations, so legislatures should be able to
eliminate these accommodations. Perhaps judges should take a
minimalist approach to the Constitutional question. This would allow the
political arena to resolve something that is fundamentally a policy
concern about public health.
However posed, the same answer applies. The question is based on
mistaken underlying assumptions concerning the relevant political
dynamic. Although those who oppose religious accommodations far
237. See e.g., Americans, Politics and Science Issues, Piw RsIiARCI CINTER (July I, 2015),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/o7/oi/americans-politics-and-science-issues/.
238. See infra noteS 251-253 and accompanying text; Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 14.
239. See JOHN HART Eiy, DEMOCRACY AND DIsIRusT: A TunoRY o1 JUIICIAi, RI~vhiiw (1980); Levin,
supra note 95.
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outnumber those who support them,24 o the latter enjoy far more political
power on this particular issue and can effectively block attempts to
change the law to eliminate the accommodations. This is consistent with
the observed political dynamics concerning religious accommodations in
general and with basic insights and predictions of political science.2"
As discussed previously, small religious groups enjoy outsized
political power and lobby effectively in the political sphere to secure
religious accommodations.242 Though small in numbers, groups like those
who oppose mandatory vaccination or support religious accommodations
to vaccination mandates are highly motivated and well-organized in
pursuing their policy preferences.2 43 The costs and risks associated with
the accommodation, in contrast, are dispersed throughout society at
large, and the risk to any particular individual is quite small. Moreover, it
is much easier to block change and maintain the status quo than it is to
pass new legislation. Because the majority of states only provide religious
accommodations, and nearly all states provide some accommodations,
even a majority that wishes to remove accommodations can be stymied
by a minority that works to maintain them.244 Those who prefer to
eliminate accommodations are unlikely to focus their energies and
lobbying power on an issue that presents are relatively small risk to
them, their children, and their communities.245 Under these conditions, it
240. See supra note 237.
241. Levin, supra note 95, at 1661-69; Zoe Robinson, Rationalizing Religious Exemptions: A
Legislative Process Theory of Statutory Exemptions for Religion, 20 WM. & MARY BILL REs. J. 133
(201 I); Zoe Robinson, Lobbying in the Shadows: Religious Interest Groups in the Legislative Process,
64 EMORY L. J. 1041, 1045 (2015); Hillel Y. Levin et al., To Accommodate or Not to Accommodate:
(When) Should the State Regulate Religion to Protect the Rights of Children and Third Parties?,
73 WASii. & LiLi L. Riv. 915, 952 (2016) [hereinafter Levin, To Accommodate or Not to
Accommodate].
242. Levin, To Accommodate or Not to Accommodate at 952. See also supra Part 111.B.2.
243. Id.; See John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287, 1314 (2010)
("political minorities [have] extraordinary power to block legislative change").
244. Pete Levitas, A Common Sense Guide to Effective Lobbying on Capitol Hill, 21 ANTITRUST 21,
22 (2007) ("it is axiomatic that it is far easier for a member to block legislation than it is for a member
to pass legislation"); David S. Rubenstein, Immigration Structuralism: A Return to Form, 8 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL'y 8I, I34 (2013) ("Given the many "vetogates" in the legislative process, it takes
considerably more votes to pass a law than to block one."); Manning, supra note 243, at 1317
("Perhaps interest groups sometimes dominate a process that is geared to make it much easier to block
rather than pass legislation."); Richard L. Hasen, Political Dysfunction and Constitutional Change, 61
DRAKE L. Riy. 989, 993 (2013) ("Aside from the requirements of bicameralism and presentment,
within the Senate and House are a series of 'vetogates,' such as committee chairs, which make it easy
to block legislation."); William N. Eskridge, Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NorRi DAMIE L. RiV.,
1441, 1443, 1444-47 (2008) (laying out a vetogates model and describing nine vetogates); Maxwell L.
Stearns, Direct (Anti-)Democracy, 8o Gio. WAsH. L. RiEv. 311 n.125 (2012) ("interest groups, including
demographic minorities, can more easily block than pass within legislatures"); see generally WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC
PoLicy 66-67 (3d ed. 2001) (defining and discussing vetogates).
245. Levin, To Accommodate or Not to Accommodate, supra note 241.
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is exceedingly difficult to overcome the powerful force of legislative
inertia and overturn the existing law.246
Given this political reality, a "focusing event" is often necessary to
alter the baseline political dynamic and allow for reconsideration of
religious accommodations. 47  In political science literature, focusing
events are "sudden, rare events that affect a relatively large number of
people and thereby attract media coverage and capture the attention of
larger publics and policymakers." 2" By drawing such attention, a focusing
event may galvanize the public to consider the dangers posed by non-
vaccination, and could spur the majority to overcome the forces of
legislative inertia and the objections of the minority in order to change
the law.249
In the context of vaccine-preventable diseases, a major outbreak can
serve as a focusing event and lead to change through normal political
channels. In California, there was a highly-publicized measles outbreak
at Disneyland in 20I4.2"o As a result of the publicity and public outcry
generated by this outbreak, California eliminated all religious and
philosophical accommodations in 2015 over the organized opposition by
a minority who wished to preserve the status quo.2' This shows that
under some conditions, legislatures can address this policy problem. But
it is hardly sufficient.
California's experience does not undermine the case for pursuing
judicial review of religious accommodations. The Constitution does not
typically stand in the way of rent-seeking or troubling laws produced by
the realities of the political economy.7'3 But where constitutional values
are at stake, as in the case of religious accommodations that impose third
246. Levin, supra note 95 at i 661-69; Levin, To Accommodate or Not to Accommodate, supra note 241.
247. For discussion of "focusing events," see Thomas A. Birkland, Focusing Events, Mobilization,
and Agenda Setting, 18 J. Pun. Po'v 53 (1998).
248. Timothy D. Lytton, Clergy Sexual Abuse Litigation: The Policymaking Role of Tort Law,
39 CONN. L. Rjv. 809, 854 (2007).
249. Id.
250. Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 14 (discussing the recent events in California).
251. S.B. 277 (Cal. 2015).
252. It is worth noting that no other state has followed California's lead. However, in light of major
disease outbreaks-that is, in light of such focusing events-some major medical associations have
begun engaging in lobbying efforts. Press Release, American Medical Association, AMA Supports
Tighter Limitations on Immunization Opt Outs (June 8, 2015), http://www.ama-assn.org/
ama/pub/news/news/2015/2015-o6-o8-tighter-limitations-immunization-opt-outs.page; Immunization
Exemptions, AM. ACAD. OF FAM. PHYSICIANS (2015)
http://www.aafp.org/about/policies/all/immunizations-exemptions.html; State Immunization Laws
Should Eliminate Non-Medical Exemptions Say Internists, AM. C. OF PHYSICIANS (July 29, 2015),
https://www.acponline.org/acp-newsroom/state-immunization-laws-should-eliminate-non-medical-
exemptions-say-internists.
253. See e.g., Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring;
expressing concern about these political dynamics and the laws they produce, but declining to find a
constitutional violation).
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party harms, we should not have to wait for more outbreaks around the
country-more sick and dead children-to galvanize the public and the
legislature. A child who cannot be vaccinated for medical reasons, or a
child of a parent who claims the religious accommodation, should not be
harmed by others' religious beliefs. This is precisely what the
Establishment Clause was meant to protect against.
A successful judicial challenge is therefore appropriate, and can
serve as its own sort of focusing event. Judicial action here would not
remove the issue from the political sphere. Under extreme pressure from
a galvanized pro-accommodation lobby, the legislature could provide
both religious and philosophical accommodations, as discussed below.
However, as already noted, such a ruling would change the political
dynamic by reversing the burden of legislative inertia. In other words, it
allows the political branches to assess the wisdom of such
accommodations, but in a context in which the default option is no
accommodations. This modification of the status quo changes the
political dynamic because it would require the political minority which
supports accommodations to affirmatively pass, rather than block, new
legislation.
By invoking the Constitution and judicial power, then, a successful
challenge to religious accommodations can be democracy-forcing rather
than democracy-inhibiting. It allows legislatures and the public to make a
choice: either the scourge of vaccine-preventable diseases is a serious
enough concern to permit no accommodations at all; or the risks are
small enough that society can tolerate a broad range of accommodations.
The only choice that is not constitutionally valid is for the government to
give religious groups a power to inflict harms on others for the sake of
benefits no one else enjoys. In this way, the courts can push the public
and the legislature to revisit the question of vaccination exceptions in a
manner consistent with constitutional dictates.
C. THE ACCEPTABLE RISK OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
Those who view the argument presented herein primarily as a
utilitarian means of achieving a desired end, namely of improving health
and minimizing disease may now articulate a different concern. If a court
ruling striking down religious accommodations could lead a state
legislature to expand the accommodation, it could open the door to more
accommodations, not fewer. A judicial decision could galvanize
opponents of mandatory vaccinations to pass even broader exceptions.
This prospect could deter some from pursuing a legal challenge in the
first place. After all, the last thing vaccination advocates would want to
do is make it even easier to secure an accommodation.
There is cause for concern. In 2002, two district courts in Arkansas
struck down as unconstitutional the state's legislation granting religious
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accommodations to only "recognized church or religious denomination
of which the parent or guardian is an adherent or member." 254 Rather
than allowing these rulings to stand and eliminating all accommodations,
the Arkansas legislature enacted a law that offered broader
accommodations.2 " The statute now provides that the state's mandatory
vaccination requirements "shall not apply if the parents or legal guardian
of that child object thereto on the grounds that immunization conflicts
with the religious or philosophical beliefs of the parent or guardian."125 6
As one commentator laments, under this new statute, "virtually any
person who requests such an exemption may qualify for it."25 7 There are
risks to bringing such a lawsuit.
These concerns are not compelling, however, for four reasons. First,
I do not believe it is likely that a state legislature today will respond to a
ruling striking down religious accommodations by expanding the
accommodations, as the Arkansas legislature did fifteen years ago.
Recently, the legislative movement has been toward eliminating or
limiting accommodations, rather than expanding them. As noted
previously, California's legislature recently succeeded in eliminating its
religious and philosophical accommodations in the wake of a high profile
disease outbreak.2 " Also in 2015, Vermont eliminated its philosophical
accommodation in an effort to boost vaccination rates, leaving only the
religious accommodation in place. Several other states have introduced
similar bills.26" Further, as discussed previously, although the political
dynamics surrounding mandatory vaccination make it difficult to repeal
laws that provide for religious accommodations,6  striking down the
religious accommodation would reverse the burden of legislative inertia.
It will be harder for an interest group to pass a new statute than it is to
block legislation from the other side.2 62 Thus, it is unlikely that state
legislatures would respond to a ruling striking down religious
accommodations by enacting broader accommodations.
Second, even if states do adopt broader accommodations, they could
do so in a manner that improves vaccination rates. Some states require
254. McCarthy v. Boozman, 212 F. Supp. 2d 945, 947 (W.D. Ark. 2002); see also Boone v.
Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d. 938, 941 (E.D. Ark. 2002); supra Part I.C.3.; M. Craig Smith, A Bad
Reaction: A Look at the Arkansas General Assembly's Response to McCarthy v. Boozman and Boone
v. Boozman, 58 ARK. L. REV. 251 (2005) (discussing McCarthy and Boone and the legislature's reaction
to them).
255. Smith, supra note 254.
256. ARK. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 6-J8-702(d)(4)(A) (2003). Smith, supra note 254.
257. Smith, supra note 254, at 251.
258. See supra 250-252 and accompanying text.
259. See Sarah Breitenbach, States Make it Harder to Skip Vaccines, VAllEy Nuws (May 29, 2016),
http://www.vnews.com/To-combat-disease-states-make-it-harder-to-skip-vaccines-2486243.
260. Id.
261. See supra note 253; see also Part III.B.2.
262. Id.
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parents seeking accommodations to be educated on the importance and
safety of vaccination.2" This has apparently been successful in reducing
rates of non-vaccination, and some scholars have suggested that it is the
most desirable and effective approach for balancing the public health
interests at stake against parents' interests.26 4
There are two possible reasons that these education requirements
may succeed in reducing non-vaccination rates. Some states make it so
simple to receive an accommodation that it is easier to do so than to be
vaccinated. 6 5 If states make it more difficult to receive the
accommodation, some people may prefer to simply accept vaccination. 66
In this view, what matters most is not whether a state offers
accommodations, but rather how easy or difficult it is to qualify for the
accommodation." It could also be that educating potential non-
vaccinators about the safety and efficacy of vaccination helps assuage
their concerns and convince some of them to vaccinate their children.s
Either way, states could effectively improve vaccination rates even while
enacting broader laws that allow for both religious and philosophical
accommodations.
Such a change is unlikely to take place in the absence of a focusing
event such as a judicial ruling, because advocates of non-vaccination
have little incentive to make it more difficult to receive an
accommodation. A judicial ruling striking down religious-only
accommodations, then, presents an opportunity to get all sides to the
table, so to speak, to hash out a new legislative compromise that best
represents and protects the relevant interests.
Third, even if states followed the lead of the Arkansas legislature
and responded to a ruling by adopting the broadest possible
accommodations, it may not matter a great deal. According to the
Centers for Disease Control, in states that offer only religious
accommodations, more people claim a religious accommodation than in
states that offer both religious and philosophical accommodations.'6 '
Those who see themselves as having philosophical, rather than religious,
objections may be able to already claim to have religious objections in
order to secure the accommodation if the statute only allows for religious
263. Nina R. Blank, Arthur L. Caplan, & Catherine Constable, Exempting School Children From
Immunizations: States With Fewer Barriers Had Highest Rates Of Nonmedical Exemptions, 32 HiIAIil
AFF. 1282 (2013); Omer et al., supra note 31; Rota et al., supra note 26; see a/so Mich. Admin. Code
r. 325-176 (2017); see also NAVIN, supra note I, at 211 (suggesting this is what states should do); Rota,
supra note 26.
264. See NAVIN, supra note I, at 212.
265. Id. at2II-12.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. See Smith, supra note 254, at 251. But see Omer et al., supra note 31.
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accommodations.270 This suggests, in turn, that a state would not
necessarily experience a substantial rise in the numbers of people seeking
accommodations, if it amended its laws to also allow for philosophical
accommodations. Therefore, the risk of a legislature adopting an
expansive accommodation in response to a judicial ruling striking down
the religious-only accommodation is less real as a de facto matter than as
a de jure matter.
These three arguments address concerns about the practical utility
of a judicial ruling striking down accommodations. At worst, vaccination
rates are unlikely to change a great deal; at best, they will be reduced
significantly.
There is yet a fourth reason that I am also not especially concerned
about the risk of a legislature expanding its accommodation regime: my
interest is not strictly utilitarian. I am equally concerned with developing
a normative, neutral principle for resolving the third party harms puzzle.
I examine the vaccination context, in part as a means of exploring and
illustrating one proposed approach; I do not adopt my proposed
approach because it leads to a desirable outcome in the vaccination
context. To be sure, I would applaud a move toward higher vaccination
rates, and I would surely be pleased if my proposed approach
contributed to that end. But contributing to that effort is not my
motivating force in proposing this approach. Even if the effort backfired
due to a legislative reaction, the contribution remains worthwhile. After
all, the nature of neutral principles is that they sometimes apply in a
manner contrary to the preferences of those who hold them.
CONCLUSION
How will constitutional law mediate the clashes between law and
religion in an increasingly diverse and heterogeneous society? How will it
balance individual and religious liberty against the costs they impose on
others? The Equality approach to this problem offers an elegant and
balanced, if incomplete, solution that asks judges to do what they are
institutionally competent to do, while leaving space for political
engagement by the public. It could also save some lives.
270. Id.
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